Judicial Usurpation of Legislative Power: Why Congress Must Reassert its Power to Determine What is “Appropriate Legislation” to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by Kovalchick, Anthony
Chapman Law Review
Volume 10 | Issue 1 Article 2
2006
Judicial Usurpation of Legislative Power: Why
Congress Must Reassert its Power to Determine
What is “Appropriate Legislation” to Enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment
Anthony Kovalchick
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anthony Kovalchick, Judicial Usurpation of Legislative Power: Why Congress Must Reassert its Power to Determine What is “Appropriate
Legislation” to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 10 Chap. L. Rev. 49 (2006).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol10/iss1/2
49-118 KOVALCHICK.DOC 12/26/2006 11:15:01 AM 
 
49 
Judicial Usurpation of Legislative Power: 
Why Congress Must Reassert its Power to  
Determine What is “Appropriate Legislation” 
to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment 
Anthony Kovalchick* 
INTRODUCTION.............................................................................49 
I.  THE BATTLE OVER THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
RESTORATION ACT OF 1993 ................................................52 
II.  THE COLLISION BETWEEN FLORES AND SEMINOLE TRIBE .....61 
A. The College Savings Bank and Florida Prepaid 
Cases ...........................................................................63 
B. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents.............................70 
C. United States v. Morrison ..........................................75 
D. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. 
Garrett .........................................................................81 
III. THE COURT’S RETREAT IN HIBBS, LANE AND GOODMAN ........86 
A. Nevada Department of Human Resources v. 
Hibbs ...........................................................................86 
B. Tennessee v. Lane .......................................................92 
C. United States v. Georgia ............................................98 
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Court has pursued a rather meticulous course of evaluating the 
constitutional bases for legislative enactments passed by Con-
gress.  This trend has not been limited to legislation enacted pur-
suant to Congress’s authority under Article I of the United States 
Constitution, but has extended to measures designed to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  At the same time, the Court has 
vigorously defended its own authority to delineate the rights of 
criminal defendants in various contexts, particularly with regard 
to Miranda v. Arizona1 and its progeny.  These seemingly unre-
lated matters have produced anomalous results regarding the 
authority of each branch of the Federal Government to enforce 
individual rights secured by the Constitution.  For the sake of the 
delicate balance of power that the Constitution was designed to 
maintain, and for the welfare of those individuals who rightly in-
voke its provisions in court, the U.S. Supreme Court must retreat 
from its present course of overreaching activism and permit Con-
gress to exercise its constitutional authority to enact more sweep-
ing legislation designed to protect individual rights. 
As Justice Scalia noted in his dissenting opinion in Dickerson 
v. United States, “[w]here the Constitution has wished to lodge in 
one of the branches of the Federal Government some limited 
power to supplement its guarantees, it has said so.”2  He was re-
ferring to provisions such as Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which states: “The Congress shall have power to en-
force, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”3  
Dickerson stands as perhaps the most obvious example of the 
Court’s insistence that it somehow possesses the authority to 
demand a little more than the Constitution actually requires in 
order to guarantee that its provisions will not be eroded.  Never-
theless, while the Court has recently taken such steps to expand 
its own prophylactic power, it has simultaneously begun to limit 
Congress’s authority to enact prophylactic legislation designed to 
enforce the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
net result has been an unfortunate shift of constitutional prophy-
lactic power from Congress to the federal courts. 
The Court began to curtail congressional authority with re-
gard to prophylactic legislation in its 1997 decision in City of 
Boerne v. Flores,4 a year after its decision in Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida.5   In Seminole Tribe, the Court held that the 
Indian Commerce Clause did not give Congress the authority to 
 
 1 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 2 530 U.S. 428, 460 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 4 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 5 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity enjoyed by the 
states.6  The case stands for the more general proposition that 
while Congress may abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment 
immunity when it validly enacts legislation under Section Five of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, it does not have that authority 
when it acts pursuant to its powers under Article I. 
Subsequently, these two decisions ended up on a collision 
course.  Congressional attempts to enforce various legal rights 
against the states became subject to a complicated judicial in-
quiry into the constitutional bases of the underlying statutes cre-
ating substantive rights.  Since Congress possesses the power to 
abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it en-
acts legislation to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the Flores 
rationale has begun to further limit Congress’s abrogation power.  
Given the fact that legislation is often based on more than one 
constitutional grant of power, some cases have presented the 
question of whether Congress has the power to use the abroga-
tion of Eleventh Amendment immunity as an enforcement 
mechanism to vindicate statutory rights that were created pur-
suant to Article I authority in conjunction with the powers de-
rived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause.  
Consequently, the abrogation option has been denied to Congress 
in instances where the Court has deemed the prophylactic legis-
lation to be in excess of the power granted in Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, even where the underlying substantive 
statutes have been concededly valid exercises of Article I power. 
The net result of these cases has been a judicial usurpation 
of the power to enforce the guarantees of the Constitution.  On 
the one hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has created its own pro-
phylactic rules to protect the rights of criminal defendants and 
has even divested Congress of the authority to replace them.7  On 
the other hand, the Court has curtailed Congress’s authority to 
enforce the rights contained within the Fourteenth Amendment, 
notwithstanding the fact that the Constitution clearly grants 
such enforcement authority to Congress and lacks any provision 
implying that such authority exists in the Judiciary.  If the Court 
continues on this perilous course, Congress will have to take the 
steps necessary to reassert its power to determine what legisla-
tion is “appropriate” in order to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 
 
 6 Id. at 76. 
 7 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (declaring Miranda to be “a constitutional rule that 
Congress may not supersede legislatively”). 
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I.  THE BATTLE OVER THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT 
OF 1993 
On November 16, 1993, President Bill Clinton signed the Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act into law.8  The Act was passed 
unanimously by the House of Representatives and with only 
three dissenting votes in the Senate.9  It was enacted in response 
to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith, which held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, does not require neutral laws 
of general application that indirectly burden the free exercise of 
religion to be narrowly tailored to secure a compelling state in-
terest.10  As the Court explained in Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, “a law that is neutral and of general 
applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental 
interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a 
particular religious practice.”11  Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc., which was decided just five months before the Act was 
signed into law, held that a challenged enactment must be “justi-
fied by a compelling interest” and “narrowly tailored to advance 
that interest” in circumstances where “the object of a law is to in-
fringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motiva-
tion.”12 
In the “Findings and Declaration of Purposes” section of the 
Act, Congress stated that “laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may 
burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere 
with religious exercise.”13  The purposes of the Act were “to re-
store the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. 
Verner14 and Wisconsin v. Yoder15 and to guarantee its applica-
tion in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially 
burdened,” as well as “to provide a claim or defense to persons 
whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by govern-
ment.”16  The statute stated that “[g]overnment shall not sub-
stantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the bur-
den results from a rule of general applicability,” unless the 
relevant governmental actor could demonstrate that the applica-
tion of the burden to the individual was both “in furtherance of a 
 
 8 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2000). 
 9 Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1529 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 10 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 11 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993). 
 12 Id. at 533. 
 13 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2) (2000). 
 14 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 15 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 16 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(1)–(2). 
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compelling governmental interest” and “the least restrictive 
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”17  
The Act permitted “[a] person whose religious exercise [had] been 
burdened in violation” of the statutory mandate to “assert that 
violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain 
appropriate relief against a government.”18 
Prior to its invalidation as applied to the states in City of 
Boerne v. Flores, the Act was upheld by three Courts of Appeals 
in different applications.  In Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission v. Catholic University of America, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected a separation 
of powers challenge to the statute brought by a litigant who con-
tended that the law was an attempt by Congress to “overturn the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.”19  
The Court of Appeals declared that the objective of Congress 
“was to overturn the effects of the Smith decision, not the deci-
sion itself.”20  The Act, according to the Court of Appeals, did 
“nothing more than substitute a statutory test for the constitu-
tional test that Smith found not to be mandated by the Free Ex-
ercise Clause in cases where the right of free exercise was bur-
dened by a neutral law of general application.”21  Nevertheless, 
Catholic University was an easy case with regard to the Act be-
cause the relevant governmental actor was an agency of the fed-
eral government rather than that of a state.22  Congress un-
doubtedly possesses the authority to create exceptions to the 
application of its own laws, provided that the exceptions them-
selves do not suffer from distinct constitutional infirmities.  
Catholic University involved an application of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, making it unnecessary for the Court to 
address the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act’s application to the states.  Consequently, it was easy for 
the Court to affirm the authority of Congress “to determine 
against whom, and under what circumstances, Title VII and 
other federal laws will be enforced.”23 
It is worthy of note that the U.S. Supreme Court recently 
applied the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, which involved a 
claim by a small religious sect that its members were entitled to 
“receive[] communion by drinking a sacramental tea, brewed 
 
 17 Id.  § 2000bb-1(a), (b)(1)–(2). 
 18 Id. § 2000bb-1(c). 
 19 83 F.3d 455, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 457. 
 23 Id. at 470. 
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from plants unique to the [Amazon Rainforest], that contain[ed] 
a hallucinogen regulated under the Controlled Substances Act by 
the Federal Government.”24  The sect had obtained a preliminary 
injunction blocking enforcement of the federal ban on the sacra-
mental tea, and this grant of a preliminary injunction was ulti-
mately affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Court con-
cluded that the courts below had not erred “in determining that 
the [Federal] Government failed to demonstrate, at the prelimi-
nary injunction stage, a compelling interest in barring the [sect’s] 
sacramental use of [the tea].”25  Absent such a showing, the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act provided the sect with an exemp-
tion from the operation of the Controlled Substances Act. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was pre-
sented with a much more difficult case in Mockaitis v. Har-
cleroad,26 which involved the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act’s application to the State of Oregon.  Coincidentally, it was 
Oregon that had secured a victory in Smith, prompting Congress 
to enact the statute in the first place.  In Mockaitis, the Court of 
Appeals relied on the Act, in part, to approve declaratory and in-
junctive relief against the taping of confessions in an Oregon 
prison.27 
Conan Wayne Hale was a suspect in three murders and two 
burglaries.28  While he was in prison, nearly all of his conversa-
tions with visitors were taped, with the sole exception being 
those conversations that he had with his attorney.29  The prison 
authorities were implicitly authorized by an Oregon statute30 to 
“intercept and record conversations between inmates and all visi-
tors save their counsel.”31  Hale was fully aware of the fact that 
approximately ninety percent of his conversations were being re-
corded.32 
On April 22, 1996, Father Timothy Mockaitis heard Hale’s 
confession in the jail’s visiting booths.33  Even though Hale was 
not a Catholic, he was eligible to participate in the Sacrament of 
Reconciliation because of his status as a baptized Christian.34  
Following the usual protocol, the conversation was recorded.  Al-
 
 24 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1216 (2006). 
 25 Id. at 1225. 
 26 104 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 27 Id. at 1534. 
 28 Id. at 1525. 
 29 Id. 
 30 OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540(2)(a)(B) (2005). 
 31 Mockaitis, 104 F.3d at 1529. 
 32 Id. at 1525, 1533. 
 33 Id. at 1525. 
 34 Id. 
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though Hale was probably aware of the fact that the recording 
was taking place, the Court of Appeals was clearly of the view 
that Father Mockaitis had absolutely no knowledge whatsoever 
about the taping of the confession.35   
The very next day, Detective Jeffrey James Carley sought a 
search warrant to obtain the tape of the confession, which was is-
sued by Judge Bryant Hodges.36  Shortly thereafter, District At-
torney Douglass Harcleroad obtained an order from Judge Kip 
Leonard to “retain and seal the tape and to prohibit anyone who 
knew its contents from divulging them without further order of 
the court.”37  Ultimately, Father Mockaitis and Archbishop Fran-
cis E. George brought an action in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Oregon seeking the destruction of both the tape itself 
and the transcript which had been made from it.38  Judge Owen 
Panner dismissed the action, and Father Mockaitis and 
Archbishop George appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, relying on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 
Without extended debate, the Court of Appeals rejected the 
State’s argument that the Act was an unconstitutional exercise of 
Congress’s power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Using the U.S. Supreme Court’s language in 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court of Appeals described Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment as “a positive grant of legisla-
tive power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in de-
termining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”39  The Court found 
the taping of the confession to be in violation of the Act because it 
substantially burdened the cleric’s free exercise of religion.  Al-
though the State’s interest in obtaining evidence of criminal ac-
tivity was assumed to be compelling, the taping of the confession 
was not the “least restrictive means of furthering that [compel-
ling governmental] interest” because the same kind of evidence 
could be obtained through diligent work on the part of the police 
and the detectives.40  The Court also found the recording to be in 
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because 
Oregon’s rules of evidence, coupled with the “uniform respect for 
the character of sacramental confession,” gave Father Mockaitis 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the conver-
sation.41 
 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 1524–25. 
 37 Id. at 1526. 
 38 Id. at 1526–27. 
 39 Id. at 1529 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)). 
 40 Id. at 1530. 
 41 Id. at 1532. 
49-118 KOVALCHICK.DOC 12/26/2006 11:15:01 AM 
56 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 10:49 
The unique aspect of this case lies in the fact that Hale was 
actually against the destruction of the tape.42  He contended that 
he had confessed to committing the two burglaries but that he 
had expressly denied committing the murders.  Ironically, even 
though Detective Carley originally sought the tape in order to 
make the case against Hale, it was Hale who ultimately wanted 
the tape for his defense.  In fact, the Court of Appeals even noted 
that it was “reasonable to infer that Hale hoped that his words 
would be recorded and preserved.”43 
In the end, the Court of Appeals agreed with Father 
Mockaitis and Archbishop George in their argument for declara-
tory relief, holding that the secret taping of the confession vio-
lated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as well as the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.44  The clergymen also ob-
tained an injunction to “restrain Harcleroad and his agents and 
employees from further violation of [the Act] and the Fourth 
Amendment by assisting, participating in or using any recording 
of a confidential communications [sic] from inmates of the Lane 
County Jail to any member of the clergy in the member’s profes-
sional character.”45  These requests for relief were to be granted 
by the District Court, on remand from the Court of Appeals.  
Nevertheless, the Court did not see fit to order the destruction of 
the tape, reasoning that the preservation of the tape for Hale’s 
trial did not substantially burden Father Mockaitis and 
Archbishop George in the exercise of their religion.46  After all, 
Hale was always free to reveal the contents of his own confession.  
Therefore, the Court permitted the tape to be preserved even as 
it instructed the District Court to enjoin further violations of the 
Act and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit likewise up-
held the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in Flores v. City of 
Boerne,47 but its decision was ultimately reversed by the U.S. Su-
preme Court.  In City of Boerne v. Flores,48 the Supreme Court 
invalidated the Act as applied to the states.  The case involved 
St. Peter Catholic Church, which had been built in 1923 and was 
only able to seat about 230 people.49  Archbishop P.F. Flores 
granted permission to the parish to enlarge the building in order 
to provide seating for the forty to sixty parishioners who were not 
 
 42 Id. at 1533. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 1533–34. 
 45 Id. at 1534. 
 46 Id. at 1531. 
 47 73 F.3d 1352, 1363 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’d 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 48 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 49 Id. at 511–12. 
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accommodated at some Sunday Masses, but the City of Boerne’s 
Historic Landmark Commission later denied the Archbishop’s 
request for the necessary building permit on the ground that St. 
Peter Church was located in a district that was designated as 
historic.  The Archbishop proceeded to bring a suit in the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Texas challenging the 
permit denial and using the Act as a basis for relief.50  Although 
the District Court concluded that the Act exceeded Congress’s 
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, its judgment was 
reversed by the Court of Appeals on interlocutory appeal.51  Ul-
timately, however, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.52 
The Court noted at the outset that the Act was specifically 
designed to protect the free exercise of religion, applicable to the 
states by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, beyond the requirements of the Smith decision.53  
Justice Kennedy, who authored the Court’s opinion, reiterated 
the language in Ex parte Virginia by declaring: 
 “Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out 
the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce 
submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all per-
sons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal 
protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohib-
ited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.”54   
He also stated that “[l]egislation which deters or remedies 
constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’s 
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct 
which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into ‘legislative 
spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.’”55 
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy drew a sharp distinction be-
tween legislation designed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment 
and legislation which attempts “to determine what constitutes a 
constitutional violation.”56  In Catholic University, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had said that 
“Congress’s objective in enacting the [Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act] was to overturn the effects of the Smith decision, not the 
decision itself.”57  In other words, while Congress lacked the au-
thority to overrule the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
 
 50 Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev’d, 73 F.3d 1352 
(5th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 51 Flores, 73 F.3d at 1362–65 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’d 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 52 City of Boerne v. Flores, 519 U.S. 926 (1996). 
 53 Flores, 521 U.S. at 512–13. 
 54 Id. at 517–18 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345–46 (1879)). 
 55 Id. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)). 
 56 Id. at 519. 
 57 EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
49-118 KOVALCHICK.DOC 12/26/2006 11:15:01 AM 
58 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 10:49 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Court of Ap-
peals sustained Congress’s power to “substitute a statutory test 
for the constitutional test that Smith found not to be mandated 
by the Free Exercise Clause in cases where the right of free exer-
cise was burdened by a neutral law of general application.”58  
Catholic University, however, did not involve the Act’s applica-
tion to the states, making it easy for the Court of Appeals to as-
sert that Congress possesses “at least the facial authority to de-
termine against whom, and under what circumstances, Title VII 
and other federal laws will be enforced.”59  There was no question 
that Congress had legislative jurisdiction to limit the application 
of neutral federal laws of general application, but Flores posed a 
more difficult question because the Act purported to limit the ap-
plication of state law. 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court agreed that Section Five 
of the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to en-
force the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, given 
that the latter was incorporated within the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause, the Court did not view the Act as a 
valid enforcement measure.  Instead, the Court saw the statute 
as an encroachment on its own interpretive authority and de-
clared that “Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by 
changing what the right is.”60  Justice Kennedy explained the ap-
plicable test for evaluating the constitutionality of Section Five 
legislation by stating that “[t]here must be a congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied 
and the means adopted to that end.”61 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was found to fail the 
congruence and proportionality test because it was not limited to 
the deterrence of actual Free Exercise Clause violations.  In-
stead, it was designed to displace the application of various state 
laws even in instances where no constitutional violations were 
present.  The statute reached every incidental burden placed on 
the exercise of religion by neutral laws of general application, 
while the Constitution only reached those laws which directly 
targeted religious practices for special legal burdens.  The Court 
noted that “[w]hen the exercise of religion has been burdened in 
an incidental way by a law of general application, it does not fol-
low that the persons affected have been burdened any more than 
other citizens, let alone burdened because of their religious be-
 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 470. 
 60 Flores, 521 U.S. at 519. 
 61 Id. at 520. 
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liefs.”62  Therefore, the Act was invalidated as applied to the 
states, and it could not be used to vindicate Archbishop Flores in 
his efforts to win an exemption from the application of the City of 
Boerne’s ordinance governing the designation and maintenance 
of historic landmarks. 
Justice Stevens authored a short concurring opinion in which 
he expressed the view that the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  
As he saw it, the statute had “provided the Church with a legal 
weapon that no atheist or agnostic [could] obtain.”63  Citing the 
Court’s decision in Wallace v. Jaffree,64 he declared that “[t]his 
governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, 
[was] forbidden by the First Amendment.”65  Although he did not 
specifically mention a distinction between the Act’s application to 
federal or state law, Justice Stevens’ opinion can only be read as 
a contention that the statute is likewise unconstitutional as ap-
plied to federal law.   
The other Justices approached the issue as one regarding 
legislative jurisdiction, with Justices O’Connor, Souter and 
Breyer expressing the dissenting view that the underlying hold-
ing in Smith should be reexamined, and Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Scalia and Ginsburg adhering to 
the view that the Act was simply in excess of Congress’s power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.66  To these eight Justices, 
there would be no reason to question the constitutionality of the 
Act as applied to the federal government because Congress would 
not need to rely on Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
restrict the application of its own laws.  Since Justice Stevens 
saw the Act as a violation of the Establishment Clause, however, 
his position must necessarily be that the Act is unconstitutional 
in all of its applications.  This logic can be inferred from the fact 
that the Establishment Clause operates as a substantive limit on 
the powers of Congress even when legislative jurisdiction is oth-
erwise present.  Although Justice Stevens joined the opinion of 
the Court in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do 
Vegetal, which involved the Act’s application to the federal gov-
ernment and vindicated the religious sect seeking relief under 
the Act, there was no constitutional challenge brought against 
the statute in that case.67 
 
 62 Id. at 535. 
 63 Id. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 64 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–55 (1985). 
 65 Flores, 521 U.S. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 66 Id. at 544–45 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Id. at 565–66 (Souter, J., dissenting); Id. 
at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Id. at 511 (majority opinion).  
 67 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1225 (2006). 
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While invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 
Flores, the Court relied to some degree on South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach,68 a precedent upholding the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 as a valid exercise of Section Two of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment.  The Court viewed the Voting Rights Act as being more di-
rectly related to enforcing the Constitution than the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, leaving one to infer that the Enforce-
ment Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
should be construed in a similar manner because of the similari-
ties in their wording. 
Nevertheless, the Court made no attempt to distinguish its 
precedents involving the power of Congress to enforce the Thir-
teenth Amendment.  In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Court 
declared that, “[b]y its own unaided force and effect, the Thir-
teenth Amendment abolished slavery, and established universal 
freedom.”69  Justice Stewart, who delivered the opinion of the 
Court, went on to say that “[w]hether or not the Amendment it-
self did any more than that—a question not involved in this 
case—it is at least clear that the Enabling Clause of that 
Amendment empowered Congress to do much more.  For that 
clause clothed Congress with power to pass all laws necessary 
and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in 
the United States.”70  Jones upheld 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which pro-
vides that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same 
right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens 
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 
personal property.”71 
In Runyon v. McCrary,72 the Court again upheld sweeping 
legislation as a valid exercise of Section Two of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  Runyon upheld 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which provides:  
 All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have 
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal bene-
fit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property 
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punish-
ment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, 
and to no other.73 
It cannot be doubted that these two statutes would fail the 
“congruence and proportionality” test described in Flores if it 
 
 68 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). 
 69 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 70 Id. at 439 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 71 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000). 
 72 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
 73 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000). 
49-118 KOVALCHICK.DOC 12/26/2006 11:15:01 AM 
2006] Judicial Usurpation of Legislative Power 61 
were to be applied in the Thirteenth Amendment context.  These 
legislative acts, though passed pursuant to Section Two of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, cannot be said to be limited to the mere 
enforcement of the underlying constitutional provision.  There 
are many actions which would violate either § 1981 or § 1982 
without violating the Thirteenth Amendment itself.  By choosing 
to rely on its Fifteenth Amendment cases while ignoring its Thir-
teenth Amendment precedents, the Supreme Court left both a 
hole in its rationale and a cloud over Congress’s power to enforce 
the Civil War Amendments.  The similar wording of these three 
constitutional provisions, all of which delegated legislative power 
to Congress that did not exist under the original Constitution, 
leaves no principled reason for treating one radically different 
from the other two. 
It is, of course, true that the Thirteenth Amendment oper-
ates against a broader array of potential transgressors.  While 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments limit only govern-
mental entities, the Thirteenth Amendment limits governmental 
and private actors alike.74  Although the Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s prohibitions have a broader target, the prohibitions them-
selves are far narrower than those contained in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The category of conduct which violates the Four-
teenth Amendment is far more inclusive than that which violates 
the Thirteenth Amendment, potentially leading one to the con-
clusion that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment should 
be construed as a broader delegation of legislative authority than 
Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment.  Notwithstanding 
this reality, the holding in Flores appears to indicate the con-
trary, especially in light of the sweeping legislative enactments 
upheld in Jones and Runyon. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not always reconciled its vari-
ous decisions interpreting the Civil War Amendments, and its 
cases have often led to implicit anomalies.75  Perhaps no anomaly 
is more glaring in this area of the law, however, than the Court’s 
recent practice of meticulously scrutinizing prophylactic legisla-
tion designed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment after up-
holding such broad legislative mandates passed pursuant to Sec-
tion Two of the Thirteenth Amendment in Jones and Runyon. 
II.  THE COLLISION BETWEEN FLORES AND SEMINOLE TRIBE 
When the U.S. Supreme Court decided Flores in 1997, it had 
 
 74 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Runyon, 427 U.S. 160. 
 75 See Ken Gormley, Racial Mind-Games and Reapportionment: When Can Race Be 
Considered (Legitimately) in Redistricting?, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L., 735, 736 (2002). 
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already decided Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida76 a year ear-
lier.  In Seminole Tribe, the Court held that the Indian Com-
merce Clause did not provide Congress with the authority to ab-
rogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity enjoyed by the 
states.77  In so holding, the Court rejected its prior plurality deci-
sion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., which held that the Inter-
state Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity and declared that the federal power to 
regulate interstate commerce would be “incomplete without the 
authority to render States liable in damages.”78  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, who authored the opinion of the Court in Seminole 
Tribe, made it clear that “[t]he Eleventh Amendment restricts 
judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to 
circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal ju-
risdiction.”79  The Court distinguished its decision in Fitzpatrick 
v. Bitzer,80 which held that Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did grant Congress the authority to abrogate the 
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.  In Seminole Tribe, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist explained that “the Fourteenth Amendment, 
adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and 
the ratification of the Constitution, operated to alter the pre-
existing balance between state and federal power achieved by Ar-
ticle III and the Eleventh Amendment.”81 
The principle that Article I does not give Congress the au-
thority to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity 
remains the law despite the Court’s recent decision in Central 
Virginia Community College v. Katz.82  In Central Virginia 
Community College, the Court declared that “the power to enact 
bankruptcy legislation was understood to carry with it the power 
to subordinate state sovereignty, albeit within a limited 
sphere.”83  Justice Stevens, who delivered the opinion of the 
Court, explained that, “[i]n ratifying the Bankruptcy Clause, the 
States acquiesced in a subordination of whatever sovereign im-
munity they might otherwise have asserted in proceedings neces-
sary to effectuate the in rem jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 
courts.”84  He went on to state that “Congress may, at its option, 
either treat States in the same way as other creditors insofar as 
 
 76 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 77 See id. at 76. 
 78 491 U.S. 1, 19 (1989) (plurality opinion), overruled by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44. 
 79 517 U.S. at 72–73. 
 80 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).  
 81 Seminole Tribe,  517 U.S. at 65–66. 
 82 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006). 
 83 Id. at 1004. 
 84 Id. at 1005. 
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concerns Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies or exempt them 
from operation of such laws.”85  This power, according to the 
Court, “arises from the Bankruptcy Clause itself” and is not de-
pendent on any purported abrogation of the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity by Congress.86  Therefore, Seminole Tribe 
remains good law despite the Court’s holding in Central Virginia 
Community College that “[a] proceeding initiated by a bank-
ruptcy trustee to set aside preferential transfers by the debtor to 
state agencies” is not barred by sovereign immunity.87 
At first glance, one might conclude that Flores and Seminole 
Tribe addressed wholly unrelated matters that one could not im-
plicate in the same case.  Nevertheless, the holdings in these two 
decisions later collided to produce a situation in which Congress 
was stripped of its power to provide the abrogation remedy in cir-
cumstances where federal legislative jurisdiction to enact the 
substantive statutory provisions was beyond question.  The prob-
lem began just two years after Flores was decided. 
A. The College Savings Bank and Florida Prepaid Cases 
In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education Expense Board, the Court held that the Trademark 
Remedy Clarification Act did not validly abrogate the states’ sov-
ereign immunity.88  Similarly, in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, the Court 
held that the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clari-
fication Act did not validly abrogate the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.89  Although the Patent Clause unambi-
guously gives Congress legislative jurisdiction to regulate the 
subject matter, that provision could not be the basis for an abro-
gation of Eleventh Amendment immunity because it is contained 
in Article I of the Constitution.  Congress amended the patent 
laws in 1992 and “expressly abrogated the States’ sovereign im-
munity from claims of patent infringement,”90 but Seminole Tribe 
foreclosed any argument to the effect that the Patent Clause, an 
Article I power, provided Congress with the constitutional au-
thority to do so.  Therefore, pursuant to Fitzpatrick, the statutory 
abrogations involved in these two cases could only be sustained if 
they were validly enacted by Congress under Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
 85 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 994. 
 88 527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999). 
 89 527 U.S. 627, 647 (1999). 
 90 Id. at 630. 
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In College Savings Bank, the Court rejected the argument 
that the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, which subjected 
the states to suits brought under section 43(a) of the Trademark 
Act of 1946 for “false and misleading advertising,”91 was a valid 
exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Justice Scalia, who delivered the 
opinion of the Court, noted at the outset that under Flores, the 
object of Section Five legislation “must be the carefully delimited 
remediation or prevention of constitutional violations.”92  College 
Savings Bank contended that Congress had passed the Act to 
prevent state deprivations, without due process of law, of two 
species of property rights.  The first was characterized as “a right 
to be free from a business competitor’s false advertising about its 
own product,” and the second was described as “a more general-
ized right to be secure in one’s business interests.”93  The Court 
was not convinced that either right qualified as a property right 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Rejecting the first asserted right, the Court declared that 
“[t]he hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to ex-
clude others.”94  The Trademark Remedy Clarification Act bore 
“no relationship to any right to exclude,”95 making College Sav-
ings Bank’s argument all the more difficult.  Justice Scalia ex-
plained that “Florida Prepaid’s alleged misrepresentations con-
cerning its own products intruded upon no interest over which 
[College Savings Bank] had exclusive dominion.”96  He went on to 
say that even if the tort of unfair competition could be viewed as 
a mechanism to protect property interests, “not everything which 
protects property interests is designed to remedy or prevent dep-
rivations of those property interests.”97 
The Court likewise rejected College Savings Bank’s second 
alleged property interest.  Reasoning that no business asset of 
College Savings Bank was impinged upon by Florida Prepaid’s 
false advertising, Justice Scalia made it clear that there was no 
deprivation of property at issue in the case.  While it was con-
ceded that any state taking of business assets would qualify as a 
deprivation of property under the Due Process Clause, College 
Savings Bank was wholly unable to identify a loss of such an as-
set.  Since the Court found no underlying violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment, it saw no reason to consider whether the 
 
 91 Coll. Sav. Bank,  527 U.S. at 669. 
 92 Id. at 672. 
 93 Id.  
 94 Id. at 673. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 674. 
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prophylactic measure taken pursuant to Section Five was “genu-
inely necessary” to prevent an actual constitutional violation.98  
It was also determined that Florida’s activities in interstate 
commerce did not constitute a waiver of the state’s Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, leaving the federal courts without juris-
diction to entertain the suit. 
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, took issue with the 
Court’s determination that the Trademark Remedy Clarification 
Act was not a valid exercise of Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  He viewed a state’s “deliberate destruction of a go-
ing business” as “a deprivation of property within the meaning of 
the Due Process Clause.”99  Emphasizing that the Act was a valid 
exercise of Congress’s Section Five power, even if Florida Pre-
paid’s allegedly false advertising did not itself amount to a con-
stitutional violation, he declared that “the validity of a congres-
sional decision to abrogate sovereign immunity in a category of 
cases” depended on “whether Congress had a reasonable basis for 
concluding that abrogation was necessary to prevent violations 
that would otherwise occur” rather than on “the strength of the 
claim asserted in a particular case within that category.”100  Jus-
tice Stevens concluded his dissent by noting that Congress’s 
judgment commanded more respect, especially in light of “the 
presumption of validity that supports all federal statutes.”101 
In Florida Prepaid, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a simi-
lar attempt by College Savings Bank to take advantage of a pur-
ported abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.  
College Savings Bank, a New Jersey chartered savings bank, ob-
tained a patent for a financing methodology “designed to guaran-
tee investors sufficient funds to cover the costs of tuition for col-
lege[].”102  The Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense 
Board, which was created by the State of Florida, administered 
similar “tuition prepayment contracts” that were available to 
residents of Florida.  College Savings Bank ultimately brought a 
patent infringement action against Florida Prepaid pursuant to 
35 U.S.C. § 271(a), arguing that Florida Prepaid had infringed its 
patent by administering a distinct tuition prepayment program.  
Two years before the action was brought, Congress had enacted 
the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification 
Act, which abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity in patent in-
 
 98 Id. at 675. 
 99 Id. at 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 
631 (1999). 
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fringement cases.103  Nonetheless, Congress enacted the Act, with 
its purported abrogation, before Seminole Tribe and Flores were 
decided, making it necessary for the Court to determine the Act’s 
constitutionality pursuant to the standards enunciated in those 
cases. 
Article I, Section Eight of the U.S. Constitution gives Con-
gress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”104  
This provision, however, could not sustain an abrogation of the 
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity because of the rule of 
Seminole Tribe.  Since Article I could not provide a basis for such 
an abrogation, College Savings Bank contended that the Patent 
Remedy Act was a valid exercise of Congress’s power to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment.105  Because Seminole Tribe fore-
closed the arguments under the Patent and Interstate Commerce 
Clauses, College Savings Bank sought refuge under the rule of 
Fitzpatrick. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the opinion of the 
Court, first pointed out that Congress had “identified no pattern 
of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of con-
stitutional violations.”106  Moving on to the inquiry required un-
der Flores, he noted that under Brown v. Duchesne107 and Con-
solidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright,108 patents are property 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  Although College Savings Bank likewise argued that the 
Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause, applicable to 
Florida by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause, provided an additional reason to justify prophylactic leg-
islation under the Enforcement Clause, the Court did not agree.  
Due to the fact that Congress had been “so explicit about invok-
ing its authority under Article I and its authority to prevent a 
State from depriving a person of property without due process of 
law under the Fourteenth Amendment,” the Court viewed the 
omission of the Just Compensation Clause from the statutory 
text and the legislative history of the Patent Remedy Act as fatal 
to College Savings Bank’s argument that the Just Compensation 
Clause provided an alternative ground to uphold the statute.109 
 
 103 See id. at 631–32.  
 104 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 105 Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 633. 
 106 Id. at 640. 
 107 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1857). 
 108 94 U.S. 92 (1877). 
 109 Fla. Prepaid,  527 U.S. at 642 n.7. 
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Reviewing the Patent Remedy Act under the Flores stan-
dard, the Court sought to identify the underlying constitutional 
violation that Congress attempted to remedy.  Relying on its 
prior decisions in Parratt v. Taylor,110 Hudson v. Palmer,111 and 
Zinermon v. Burch,112 the Court declared that “a State’s in-
fringement of a patent, though interfering with a patent owner’s 
right to exclude others, does not by itself violate the Constitu-
tion.”113  This is because a deprivation of a constitutionally pro-
tected property interest by a state actor does not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment if the state actor provides due process.  
What is unconstitutional, in this context, “is the deprivation of 
such an interest without due process of law.”114  Therefore, the 
Court made it clear that “only where the State provides no rem-
edy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its 
infringement of their patent could a deprivation of property 
without due process result.”115  It was likewise noted that Florida 
provided both a legislative remedy116 and a judicial remedy117 “to 
patent owners for alleged infringement on the part of the 
State.”118 
While the Court was sympathetic to the “need for uniformity 
in the construction of patent law,” it insisted that such a factor 
belonged to the “Article I patent-power calculus” and not “to any 
determination of whether a state plea of sovereign immunity de-
prives a patentee of property without due process of law.”119  The 
Court went on to say that Congress, while enacting the Patent 
Remedy Act, had focused on negligent infringements of patents 
by the states and not on examples of reckless or intentional in-
fringements.  Under Daniels v. Williams, negligent conduct by a 
state actor which results in an unintended injury to a person’s 
liberty or property does not constitute a “deprivation” for Due 
Process Clause purposes.120  Consequently, the Court was per-
suaded that Congress’s purported abrogation of the states’ Elev-
enth Amendment immunity was in response to various patent in-
fringements by states in which no deprivations of property could 
be established, let alone deprivations of property without due 
 
 110 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
 111 468 U.S. 517 (1984). 
 112 494 U.S. 113 (1990). 
 113 Fla. Prepaid,  527 U.S. at 643. 
 114 Zinermon,  494 U.S. at 125. 
 115 Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643. 
 116 See Fla. Stat. § 11.065 (2005). 
 117 See Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Fla. Dept. of Transp, 626 So.2d 1333, 1337 
(Fla. 1993). 
 118 Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 644 n.9. 
 119 Id. at 645. 
 120 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). 
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process of law.  The Court emphasized that “Congress did noth-
ing to limit the coverage of the Act to cases involving arguable 
constitutional violations, such as where a State refuses to offer 
any state-court remedy for patent owners whose patents it had 
infringed.”121  Congress made no “attempt to confine the reach of 
the Act by limiting the remedy to certain types of infringement, 
such as nonnegligent infringement or infringement authorized 
pursuant to state policy,” nor did it provide for suits “only against 
States with questionable remedies or a high incidence of in-
fringement.”122  Therefore, the Patent Remedy Act, unable to 
pass the “congruence and proportionality” test established in Flo-
res, was invalidated as being in excess of Congress’s power under 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.  This was largely be-
cause the underlying state conduct, in most instances reached by 
the statute, was not itself unconstitutional. 
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices 
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, questioned whether the Daniels 
standard for identifying a deprivation of a constitutionally pro-
tected property interest applied in the patent infringement con-
text.123  He contended that “the Daniels line of cases ha[d] only 
marginal relevance” to the case at hand because College Savings 
Bank was alleging that Florida Prepaid’s infringement had been 
willful.124  He also noted that it was reasonable for Congress to 
assume that state remedies for patent infringement did not exist 
because it “had long ago pre-empted state jurisdiction over pat-
ent infringement cases.”125  Justice Stevens went on to point out 
that Alden v. Maine, which was decided that same day, and 
which held that “the powers delegated to Congress under Arti-
cle I . . . do not include the power to subject nonconsenting States 
to private suits for damages in state courts,”126 would likely pre-
clude Congress from requiring state courts to “entertain in-
fringement actions when a State is named as a defendant.”127  He 
asserted that the Patent Remedy Act passed the “congruence and 
proportionality” test established in Flores because its sole pur-
pose was to “abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity as a de-
fense to a charge of patent infringement.”128  He reasoned that 
“congruence [was] equally precise whether infringement of pat-
ents by state actors [was] rare or frequent,” since the impact of 
 
 121 Fla. Prepaid,  527 U.S. at 646–47. 
 122 Id. at 647. 
 123 Id. at  653 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 658. 
 126 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999). 
 127 Fla. Prepaid,  527 U.S. at 659 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 128 Id. at 662. 
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the statute would “expand in precise harmony with the growth of 
the problem that Congress anticipated and sought to prevent.”129  
This was because the statute would only apply in instances 
where a state raised its sovereign immunity as a defense to a 
patent infringement action, regardless of how common or rare 
such infringements were. 
Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank, which were de-
cided on the same day, were only the first examples of the prob-
lems created as a result of the collision between Seminole Tribe 
and Flores.  Nonetheless, they continue to serve as a stark illus-
tration of the resulting enforcement anomaly.  Although Article I 
undoubtedly confers on Congress the legislative jurisdiction to 
regulate patents and trademarks, Seminole Tribe prevents Con-
gress from using that power to abrogate the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity in infringement cases.  While Fitzpatrick 
permits such an abrogation pursuant to Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the narrow construction given to that consti-
tutional provision in Flores significantly impedes the use of that 
legislative option. 
The power vested in Congress by the Copyright and Patent 
Clause is very extensive, as was recently illustrated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft.130  In Eldred, the 
Court declared that “the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to 
prescribe ‘limited Times’ for copyright protection and to secure 
the same level and duration of protection for all copyright hold-
ers, present and future.”131  In so holding, the Court rejected the 
argument that “a time prescription, once set, becomes forever 
fixed or inalterable.”132  Justice Ginsburg, who authored the opin-
ion of the Court, likewise noted that the “congruence and propor-
tionality” standard established in Flores was not applicable in 
Eldred and could not be invoked to ensure that legislation ex-
tending copyrights was appropriately in pursuit of the purposes 
of the Copyright and Patent Clause.  She contrasted the two dif-
ferent constitutional provisions by saying that “Section 5 author-
izes Congress to enforce commands contained in and incorporated 
into the Fourteenth Amendment,” while the Copyright and Pat-
ent Clause “empowers Congress to define the scope of the sub-
stantive right.”133  Consequently, the deference given to Congress 
in the Article I context is much broader than that shown in Flo-
res, which involved an interpretation of the Enforcement Clause. 
 
 129 Id. at 662–63. 
 130 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 131 Id. at 199. 
 132 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 133 Id. at 218. 
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This deference, however, did not help College Savings Bank 
because of the rule enunciated in Seminole Tribe.  Notwithstand-
ing the extensive nature of Congress’s authority under the Copy-
right and Patent Clause, the Eleventh Amendment operated as a 
barrier to federal adjudicatory jurisdiction in Florida Prepaid 
and College Savings Bank.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s descrip-
tion of the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act and the Patent 
Remedy Act as disproportionate attempts to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment may make some sense, but the broad nature 
of these statutes is unsurprising when the timing of their enact-
ment is considered.  The Patent Remedy Act, for instance, was 
enacted in response to Chew v. California,134 which was a 1990 
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  It 
held that the patent statutes did not contain the clear statement 
of Congress’s intent to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity 
required under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Atascadero 
State Hospital v. Scanlon.135  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., issued in 1989, affirmed Con-
gress’s authority to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment 
immunity pursuant to the Commerce Clause.136  Congress, rely-
ing on Union Gas Co., passed the Patent Remedy Act in 1992 and 
abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in patent 
infringement cases pursuant to its powers under the Patent 
Clause, the Commerce Clause, and Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment.  Four years later, Seminole Tribe overruled 
Union Gas Co. and made it clear that Article I powers cannot be 
used to effect such abrogations.137  When the Patent Remedy Act 
was passed, however, Congress saw no need to tailor the remedy 
to the limits of its authority under the Enforcement Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, given that two clauses in Article I were 
also being invoked and that Seminole Tribe had not yet been de-
cided. 
B. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents 
The enforcement anomaly that began in 1999 with Florida 
Prepaid and College Savings Bank continued into the Court’s 
next term.  In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, as amended in 1974 to cover the states by abrogating 
their sovereign immunity, was in excess of Congress’s power to 
 
 134 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 135 473 U.S. 234 (1985). 
 136 491 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1989) (plurality opinion), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 137 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72–73. 
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enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.138  The Act makes it illegal 
for an employer, governmental or private, “to fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
age.”139  It protects individuals age forty and over, subject to cer-
tain exceptions specifically enumerated in the text of the Act.  
Various plaintiffs sued their state employers under the Act, al-
leging that they were discriminated against on the basis of age.140  
The defendants contended that the Eleventh Amendment barred 
the suits.  The cases were consolidated on appeal by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which held that the 
states were immune from suits brought in federal court for viola-
tions of the Act.141  Ultimately, the cases reached the U.S. Su-
preme Court. 
After conceding that Congress had unequivocally expressed 
its intent to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
the Court went on to decide whether the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act was a valid exercise of Congress’s power under 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The opinion of the 
Court in Kimel was delivered by Justice O’Connor, who noted at 
the outset that the application of the Act’s substantive provisions 
to the states had already been upheld.142  In EEOC v. Wyoming, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Act was a valid exercise of 
Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce, making it 
unnecessary for the Court to determine whether Section Five of 
the Fourteenth Amendment provided an alternative ground for 
upholding the statute.143  The Eleventh Amendment, of course, 
does not bar suits brought by the United States against a 
state.144 
In Kimel, however, the Court had to resolve the Enforcement 
Clause question.  Although EEOC had found the Act to be a valid 
exercise of Congress’s power under the Interstate Commerce 
Clause, the rule of Seminole Tribe prevented the plaintiffs in Ki-
mel from using that precedent to assert federal adjudicatory ju-
risdiction.145  The Court began its discussion of the Enforcement 
Clause issue by declaring that Congress’s power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment “includes the authority both to remedy 
 
 138 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000). 
 139 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000). 
 140 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66. 
 141 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (1998), aff’d, 528 U.S. 62. 
 142 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 78.  
 143 460 U.S. 226 at 243 (1983). 
 144 See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001). 
 145 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 78–79.  
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and to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohib-
iting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which 
is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text.”146  Nonetheless, 
it was also noted that the determination of “whether purportedly 
prophylactic legislation constitutes appropriate remedial legisla-
tion, or instead effects a substantive redefinition of the Four-
teenth Amendment right at issue, is often difficult.”147 
Despite any perceived difficulty posed by the question, the 
Court concluded that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
was not a valid exercise of Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because the Act’s substantive provisions were “dis-
proportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that conceivably 
could be targeted.”148  Relying on its prior decisions in Gregory v. 
Ashcroft,149 Vance v. Bradley,150 and Massachusetts Board of Re-
tirement v. Murgia,151 the Court explained that “States may dis-
criminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth 
Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally re-
lated to a legitimate state interest.”152  This is because age is not 
a suspect classification for Equal Protection Clause purposes.  
Age classifications made by a state are not inherently suspect be-
cause older persons have not been subject to a “history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment,”153 nor are they members of a “dis-
crete and insular minority.”154  Unlike classifications based on 
race or gender, age classifications cannot properly be character-
ized as “so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate 
state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are 
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy.”155  Therefore, as the 
Court made clear in Kimel, “a State may rely on age as a proxy 
for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics that are relevant 
to the State’s legitimate interests,” even though age may prove to 
be an “inaccurate proxy” from time to time.156 
According to the Court, the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act required far more of state employers than did the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Act in-
cluded exceptions permitting employers to defend themselves 
against suits by demonstrating that age was “a bona fide occupa-
 
 146 Id. at 81 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997)). 
 147 Id. at 81 (citing Flores, 521 U.S. at 519–20). 
 148 Id. at 83. 
 149 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991). 
 150 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979). 
 151 427 U.S. 307, 317 (1976) (per curiam). 
 152 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83. 
 153 Murgia,  427 U.S. at 313. 
 154 Kimel,  528 U.S. at 83. 
 155 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
 156 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84.  
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tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation 
of the particular business” or that “the differentiation [was] 
based on reasonable factors other than age.”157  The plaintiffs ar-
gued that these exceptions narrowed the reach of the Act, 
thereby making it a more “congruent” and “proportional” prophy-
lactic measure designed to enforce the Equal Protection 
Clause.158  The Court rejected this argument, however, because it 
had narrowly construed these exceptions in Western Air Lines, 
Inc. v. Criswell159 and Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,160 leaving the 
Act’s substantive requirements “at a level akin to [the Court’s] 
heightened scrutiny cases under the Equal Protection Clause.”161  
The Act, so construed, prohibited employers from using age as a 
proxy for other characteristics related to an employee’s work.  
Given that construction, the Act’s protection was deemed to ex-
tend far beyond that provided by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court went on to say that “Congress’s failure to uncover 
any significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination” only 
served to confirm that “Congress had no reason to believe that 
broad prophylactic legislation was necessary in this field.”162  
Justice O’Connor explained that Congress’s purpose for enacting 
the Act was to raise the level of scrutiny applicable in age dis-
crimination cases rather than to enforce the guarantees of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  This purpose, of course, justified a 
valid exercise of the Commerce Clause power, but the rule of 
Seminole Tribe prevented that provision from being used to effect 
an abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.  
Since the Act was not viewed as a valid abrogation of the Elev-
enth Amendment immunity enjoyed by the defendant state enti-
ties, the suits were dismissed. 
Justice Stevens authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Jus-
tices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.163  Focusing more on the rule 
enunciated in Seminole Tribe than on the Flores standard, Jus-
tice Stevens insisted that “Congress’s power to authorize federal 
remedies against state agencies that violate federal statutory ob-
ligations is coextensive with its power to impose those obligations 
on the States in the first place.”164  In his view, Seminole Tribe 
had been wrongly decided, forcing the Court to “resolve vexing 
questions of constitutional law” respecting Congress’s authority 
 
 157 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000). 
 158 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82–83. 
 159 472 U.S. 400, 423 (1985). 
 160 507 U.S. 604, 616 (1993). 
 161 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88. 
 162 Id. at 91. 
 163 Id. at 92 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 164 Id. at 93. 
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to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.165  After all, the substan-
tive provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act had 
already been upheld in EEOC v. Wyoming as a valid exercise of 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.166  Had Union 
Gas Co. not been overruled by Seminole Tribe, Article I would 
have provided a constitutionally adequate basis for effecting the 
desired abrogation of the states’ sovereign immunity.  He also 
questioned the idea that the Judicial Branch should serve as the 
guardian of state sovereignty. 
In an intricate manner, Justice Stevens described the struc-
tural protections provided to the states by the Constitution.  He 
referred to Article I’s allocation to the states of equal representa-
tion in the Senate as the Constitution’s “principal structural pro-
tection for the sovereignty of the several States.”167  After empha-
sizing that point, he went on to note that “[t]he electors who 
choose the President are appointed in a manner directed by the 
state legislatures,” providing structural protection for the states 
as they fulfill their role in selecting the only governmental figure 
who can sign or veto statutes passed by Congress.168  These 
structural safeguards in the Constitution, according to Justice 
Stevens, made the Court’s “ancient judge-made doctrine of sover-
eign immunity” unnecessary.169 
Finally, Justice Stevens highlighted his contempt for the 
holding in Seminole Tribe by declaring that the Eleventh 
Amendment only placed “a textual limitation on the diversity ju-
risdiction of the federal courts.”170  In his view, the Eleventh 
Amendment did not apply to federal question cases, making it 
wholly inapplicable to the Kimel case.  He suggested that it made 
no sense to permit Congress to abrogate the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity since it was a jurisdictional limit akin to 
those contained in Article III, but he nevertheless construed the 
Amendment’s text to preclude its application to the case before 
the Court. 
Perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court’s broad construction of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act in Kimel benefits most 
older workers, particularly those who work for private employers.  
Interpreting the Act more narrowly would likely have preserved 
the abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
providing a more effective remedy for state workers but sacrific-
 
 165 Id. at 98. 
 166 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983). 
 167 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 93 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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 169 Id. at 93. 
 170 Id. at 97. 
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ing some of the substantive protections that the Act currently 
provides to non-state workers.  The Court’s subsequent decision 
in Smith v. City of Jackson further illustrates the breadth of the 
Act’s protection by holding that the Act permits recovery under a 
disparate-impact theory of liability in certain instances.171  The 
Court’s recent decision in Clark v. Martinez makes it clear that 
the same statute cannot be construed differently in some cases 
merely because some applications raise serious constitutional 
questions while others do not.172  Therefore, one could argue that 
the construction of the Act in Kimel saved its effectiveness for the 
overwhelming majority of older workers in the United States.  
Notwithstanding this reality, however, Justice Stevens’ conten-
tion that Seminole Tribe forced the Court to reach an otherwise 
inconsequential constitutional inquiry is noteworthy, especially 
when coupled with his view that the Eleventh Amendment has 
no application to federal question cases.  What is true, in any 
event, is the fact that the Flores standard, enunciated in the af-
termath of Seminole Tribe, severely limited Congress’s authority 
to enforce concededly valid federal legislation, as was the case 
with the Act at issue in Kimel.  The Act, of course, was upheld in 
EEOC.173  Had the Court adopted a construction of Section Five 
of the Fourteenth Amendment similar to that given to Section 
Two of the Thirteenth Amendment in Jones and Runyon, the 
plaintiffs in Kimel could have proceeded with their cases in fed-
eral court despite the holding in Seminole Tribe. 
C. United States v. Morrison 
Later that year, the U.S. Supreme Court decided another 
case involving Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Unlike College Savings Bank, Florida Prepaid and 
Kimel, United States v. Morrison174 involved neither the Eleventh 
Amendment nor a concededly valid substantive statutory 
scheme.  Instead, Morrison involved a constitutional challenge to 
the Violence Against Women Act, which provided a federal civil 
remedy to vindicate victims of gender-motivated violence.175  The 
case began when a female student at Virginia Polytechnic Insti-
tute sued two members of the Institute’s football team under the 
Act, accusing them of raping her.  The Act defined a crime of vio-
lence “motivated by gender” as “a crime of violence committed be-
cause of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in 
 
 171 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1546 (2005). 
 172 125 S. Ct. 716, 726 (2005). 
 173 EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983). 
 174 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 175 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000). 
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part, to an animus based on the victim’s gender.”176  Federal and 
state courts were given concurrent jurisdiction over complaints 
brought under the Act.  Congress invoked its authority under 
both Article I, Section Eight and Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as its sources of constitutional power to enact the 
legislation.177 
The United States, in defending the constitutionality of the 
Act, relied on both the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.178  Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court 
determined that the Act could not be sustained under either pro-
vision.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the opinion of the 
Court in Morrison, explained why the Act was in excess of Con-
gress’s legislative authority. 
The Court began its analysis of the Commerce Clause issue 
by noting that the provision gives Congress the authority to 
“regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.”179  
Moreover, Congress possesses the power to “regulate and protect 
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or 
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come 
only from intrastate activities.”180  Finally, and most relevant to 
the situation in Morrison, Congress has the authority to “regu-
late those activities having a substantial relation to interstate 
commerce,” or “those activities that substantially affect inter-
state commerce.”181  Having laid out the scope of federal legisla-
tive authority in this area, the Court proceeded to evaluate the 
Violence Against Women Act pursuant to the standard enunci-
ated in United States v. Lopez.182  In Lopez, the Court invalidated 
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal 
crime to knowingly possess a firearm within close proximity to a 
school, as an excess of Congress’s authority to regulate interstate 
commerce.183 
The relevant inquiry considered four factors, all of which 
were initially identified in Lopez.  It was necessary for this de-
tailed examination to proceed because the Violence Against 
Women Act, like the Gun-Free School Zones Act invalidated in 
Lopez, could not be characterized as a regulation of either the 
channels or the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.  The 
first factor discussed by the Court was the fact that “[g]ender-
 
 176 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (2000). 
 177 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607. 
 178 Id. at 609. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
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 182 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 183 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000); id. at 567–68. 
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motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, 
economic activity.”184  Second, it was noted that the Violence 
Against Women Act did not contain a jurisdictional element lim-
iting its reach to a discrete class of cases substantially related to 
interstate commerce.  Instead, Congress had chosen to cast the 
Act’s remedy “over a wider, and more purely intrastate, body of 
violent crime.”185  The third Lopez factor involved an examination 
into whether Congress identified specific findings to demonstrate 
the regulated activity’s effect on interstate commerce.  Even 
though the Act was “supported by numerous findings regarding 
the serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims 
and their families,” the Court declared that “the existence of con-
gressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the con-
stitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.”186  Finally, the 
Court viewed the link between gender-motivated violence and in-
terstate commerce as simply too attenuated to justify such an ex-
pansion of federal legislative jurisdiction under the guise of the 
Commerce Clause.  Emphasizing this point, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist concluded the Commerce Clause analysis by stating 
that “if Congress may regulate gender-motivated violence, it 
would be able to regulate murder or any other type of violence 
since gender-motivated violence, as a subset of all violent crime, 
is certain to have lesser economic impacts than the larger class of 
which it is a part.”187 
Since the Violence Against Women Act was not deemed to be 
a valid exercise of federal legislative authority under Article I, 
the Court proceeded to address the question of whether the Act 
could be sustained on the alternative ground that it was a law 
designed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Act was 
passed, in large measure, to deal with the “pervasive bias in 
various state justice systems against victims of gender-motivated 
violence.”188  The Court noted Congress’s conclusion that “dis-
criminatory stereotypes often result in insufficient investigation 
and prosecution of gender-motivated crimes, inappropriate focus 
on the behavior and credibility of the victims of that crime, and 
unacceptably lenient punishments for those who are actually 
convicted of gender-motivated violence.”189  For these reasons, the 
United States defended the Act as being necessary to remedy the 
states’ biases and to deter further instances of gender-based dis-
crimination in the state courts.  It was argued that the inherent 
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unfairness in the justice system itself operated as a denial of 
equal protection, opening the door for federal legislation pursu-
ant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Nevertheless, the Court was unsympathetic to the argu-
ments raised by the United States and the plaintiff.  Relying on 
its prior decisions in United States v. Harris190 and the Civil 
Rights Cases,191 the Court declared that Enforcement Clause leg-
islation cannot be “directed exclusively against the action of pri-
vate persons, without reference to the laws of the State, or their 
administration by her officers.”192  Emphasizing the point fur-
ther, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the Act did nothing 
to hold any Virginia public official accountable for doing an in-
adequate job of investigating or prosecuting the alleged as-
sault.193  Instead, the Act was designed solely to provide a private 
remedy for the victim via the use of a direct suit against her al-
leged attackers.  Finally, the Court found the Act to be excessive 
in that it applied uniformly throughout the United States and 
was not limited to those states in which discrimination against 
the victims of gender-motivated crimes could be identified.  
Therefore, the Act was not deemed to be akin to the federal stat-
utes upheld in Katzenbach v. Morgan194 and South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach.195  Those enactments, of course, were directed solely 
to the particular states in which Congress found evidence of un-
constitutional discrimination.  For these reasons, the Violence 
Against Women Act was invalidated as an excess of the powers 
granted to Congress under both Article I, Section Eight and Sec-
tion Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Justice Thomas authored a short concurring opinion in 
which he expressed the view that Lopez’s “substantial effects” 
test, though somewhat circumscribed, would encourage Congress 
to “persist in its view that the Commerce Clause has virtually no 
limits.”196  He urged the Court to replace the Lopez test with one 
more consistent with the “original understanding” of the Com-
merce Clause.197  Justices Souter and Breyer both authored dis-
senting opinions.198  Justice Souter focused primarily on Con-
gress’s findings, which included detailed evidence of the 
detrimental effect that gender-motivated violence has on inter-
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state commerce.  He contended that “[t]he business of the courts 
is to review the congressional assessment, not for soundness but 
simply for the rationality of concluding that a jurisdictional basis 
exists in fact.”199  Citing evidence provided by Congress indicat-
ing that violent crime against women costs the country at least 
$3 billion each year, Justice Souter asserted that Congress had 
good reasons to assume that the Commerce Clause gave it the 
power to provide a civil remedy for the victims of gender-
motivated violence.200  Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer 
joined his dissenting opinion.201 
Justice Breyer, in a separate dissent, declared that the lan-
guage in the Constitution “says nothing about either the local na-
ture, or the economic nature, of an interstate-commerce-affecting 
cause.”202  Relying on the Court’s prior decision in Heart of At-
lanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,203 he insisted that “virtually 
every kind of activity, no matter how local, genuinely can affect 
commerce, or its conditions, outside the State.”204  He referred to 
the structural protections for the states that were discussed in 
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Kimel, explaining that the Judicial 
Branch was overstepping its bounds by meticulously scrutinizing 
Congress’s judgment.  Justice Breyer stated that “within the 
bounds of the rational, Congress, not the courts, must remain 
primarily responsible for striking the appropriate state/federal 
balance.”205  Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg joined this 
portion of Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion.206 
In a later portion of his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer 
stated that his conclusion that the Violence Against Women Act 
was a valid exercise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce made it unnecessary for him to reach a conclusion with 
regard to the Enforcement Clause issue.207  Nevertheless, he 
questioned why the Court found Congress to lack the power to 
provide a remedy for victims of gender-motivated crimes against 
private actors.  Even though the private actors who allegedly at-
tacked the victim in question did not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Justice Breyer viewed the Act as an exercise of 
Congress’s power to enact remedial legislation that “prohibits 
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conduct which is not itself unconstitutional.”208  Since the Act did 
nothing more than provide a federal remedy for victims of con-
duct that was already criminalized by state law, he did not agree 
with the Court’s characterization of the remedy as disproportion-
ate.  He added that there was no lack of “congruence and propor-
tionality,” for purposes of the Flores standard, because the Act 
dealt with nothing other than “the creation of a federal remedy to 
substitute for constitutionally inadequate state remedies.”209 Jus-
tice Stevens joined this portion of Justice Breyer’s dissenting 
opinion, which consisted of skeptical observations about the 
Court’s Enforcement Clause analysis without purporting to give 
a firm answer to the question presented. 
The holding in Morrison regarding the Fourteenth Amend-
ment issue was consistent with the Court’s prior decision in De-
Shaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,210 
which made it clear that the Constitution does not impose an af-
firmative duty on the states to protect individuals from violent 
criminals.  This principle was further illustrated by the Court’s 
recent decision in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales.211  Justice 
Scalia, who delivered the opinion of the Court in Gonzales, ex-
plained that “the benefit that a third party may receive from hav-
ing someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger 
protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its proce-
dural nor in its ‘substantive’ manifestations.”212  Nevertheless, 
Congress’s judgment that victims of gender-motivated violence 
were being effectively denied the equal protection of the laws was 
entitled to more deference than that shown by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  The Violence Against Women Act was designed to counter 
the apparent inadequacies found in the justice systems of the 
several states.  Such inadequacies, in many instances, could lead 
to violations of the Equal Protection Clause.  While it is true that 
the Act was directed at private conduct rather than state action, 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment delegates the en-
forcement power to Congress.  Congress believed that the Act 
was “appropriate legislation”213 to deal with the problem of de 
facto gender discrimination in the criminal justice system, and 
the means chosen to address the perceived constitutional defi-
ciencies should have been accorded the respect owed to the peo-
ple’s elected representatives.  The Court again made no attempt 
to distinguish the narrow construction given to Section Five of 
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the Fourteenth Amendment in Morrison from the broad con-
struction given to Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment in 
Jones and Runyon.  While it is true that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment itself applies to private conduct, it is also true that the 
sweeping legislative enactments upheld in those two cases went 
far beyond the prohibitions contained in the underlying constitu-
tional provision.  The Court has not explained why the Enforce-
ment Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should be read more 
narrowly than its almost identical counterpart. 
D. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett 
The following year, the Court decided another case involving 
the interaction between the standards enunciated in Seminole 
Tribe and Flores.  Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama 
v. Garrett214 posed the question of whether Title I of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990215 constituted a valid abroga-
tion of the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.  The Act’s 
substantive provisions were not challenged as an excess of Con-
gress’s legislative authority under Article I, but the holding in 
Seminole Tribe prevented the concededly valid statutory re-
quirements from justifying an abrogation of the states’ sovereign 
immunity.  Therefore, the plaintiffs were required to demon-
strate that the Act was a valid exercise of Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment before they could pursue their case.  
Like the plaintiffs in College Savings Bank, Florida Prepaid and 
Kimel, they were unsuccessful.216 
The Act prohibits covered employers, including the states, 
from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a dis-
ability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job 
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other 
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”217  To facilitate 
the Act’s objectives, employers covered by its provisions are re-
quired to “mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known 
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individ-
ual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless [the 
employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would im-
pose an undue hardship on the operation of the [employer’s] 
business.”218  Congress clearly expressed its intent to subject the 
states to suits brought by private individuals for violations of the 
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Act, making it unnecessary for the Court to engage in an exten-
sive analysis of how to interpret the statute.219 
The Court began the inquiry required under Flores by look-
ing to its prior decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Liv-
ing Center, Inc.220 made it clear that “States are not required by 
the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for 
the disabled, so long as their actions toward such individuals are 
rational.”221  The Court explained that classifications based on 
disability, like the age classifications discussed in Kimel, “cannot 
run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational re-
lationship between the disparity of treatment and some legiti-
mate governmental purpose.”222  Therefore, it was apparent to 
the Court that the requirements of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act extended far beyond the mandates of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.  After all, not all violations of the Act resulted from 
irrational discrimination, given that an employer may reasonably 
conclude that it is less costly to hire healthy employees than it is 
to make special accommodations for disabled workers. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the Court’s opinion 
in Garrett, went on to “examine whether Congress identified a 
history and pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimina-
tion by the States against the disabled.”223  Examples of dis-
crimination by local governments were deemed irrelevant to the 
inquiry.  Even though the actions of local governments constitute 
state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court’s determination in Lincoln County v. Luning224 that local 
governments do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity pre-
cluded congressional reliance on misconduct by local governmen-
tal entities for purposes of establishing the needed pattern of 
state misconduct.225 
Although the record provided evidence of unwillingness on 
the part of some state officials to make the sort of accommoda-
tions for the disabled required by the Act, the Equal Protection 
Clause did not mandate such accommodations.  The Act did con-
tain an exception for employers able to demonstrate that the ac-
commodation requirement would impose an “undue hardship on 
the operation of the business”226 involved.  The Court insisted 
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that the accommodation duty imposed by the Act still far ex-
ceeded the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment in that it 
made unlawful “a range of alternate responses that would be 
reasonable but would fall short of imposing an ‘undue burden’ 
upon the employer.”227  It was also noted that the Act placed the 
burden on the employer to prove that it would suffer such a 
hardship, while the complaining party had to “negate reasonable 
bases for the employer’s decision” to establish a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.228  Finally, the Court found the Act’s 
prohibition against the use of “standards, criteria, or methods of 
administration” that had a disparate impact on the disabled to be 
out of proportion with the Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.  
In Washington v. Davis, the Court had found evidence of a dispa-
rate impact on racial minorities, standing alone, to be insufficient 
to establish a violation of the equal protection component of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.229 
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded the opinion of the Court 
by contrasting the Americans with Disabilities Act with the Vot-
ing Rights Act upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.230  After 
stating that “Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is virtually 
identical to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,”231 he described 
the Voting Rights Act as “a detailed but limited remedial scheme 
designed to guarantee meaningful enforcement of the Fifteenth 
Amendment in those areas of the Nation where abundant evi-
dence of States’ systematic denial of those rights was identi-
fied.”232  He declared that “in order to authorize private individu-
als to recover money damages against the States, there must be a 
pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must 
be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation.”233  Con-
sequently, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act was 
found to be in excess of Congress’s power to enforce the substan-
tive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In a footnote, the 
Court noted that Title I’s provisions still applied to the states and 
could be “enforced by the United States in actions for money 
damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for injunc-
tive relief under Ex parte Young.”234 
Justice Kennedy authored a concurring opinion, joined by 
 
 227 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372. 
 228 Id. 
 229 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
 230 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966). 
 231 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373 n.8. 
 232 Id. at 373. 
 233 Id. at 374. 
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Justice O’Connor.235  He expressed his agreement with the Court 
by declaring that “[t]he predicate for money damages against an 
unconsenting State in suits brought by private persons must be a 
federal statute enacted upon the documentation of patterns of 
constitutional violations committed by the State in its official ca-
pacity.”236  Since no pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by 
the states had been identified, Justice Kennedy believed that the 
Act was in excess of Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Garrett was a five to four decision, with Justice Breyer au-
thoring a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Souter 
and Ginsburg.237  Justice Breyer insisted that the Court had not 
“traditionally required Congress to make findings as to state dis-
crimination, or to break down the record evidence, category by 
category.”238  As he saw it, the inquiry in cases like Katzenbach v. 
Morgan239 had been “whether Congress’s likely conclusions were 
reasonable.”240  He saw no need for the Court to focus on whether 
there was “adequate evidentiary support in the record.”241  La-
menting the lack of deference shown to the Legislative Branch, 
he noted that “[t]he Court’s failure to find sufficient evidentiary 
support may well rest upon its decision to hold Congress to a 
strict, judicially created evidentiary standard, particularly in re-
spect to lack of justification.”242 
Justice Breyer went on to decry the Court’s misapprehension 
of its role in the case.  He stated that “neither the ‘burden of 
proof’ that favors States nor any other rule of restraint applicable 
to judges applies to Congress when it exercises its § 5 power.”243  
He contended that “Congress directly reflects public attitudes 
and beliefs, enabling Congress better to understand where, and 
to what extent, refusals to accommodate a disability amount to 
behavior that is callous or unreasonable to the point of lacking 
constitutional justification.”244  Although he acknowledged that 
“what is ‘reasonable’ in the statutory sense and what is ‘unrea-
sonable’ in the constitutional sense might differ,”245 Justice 
Breyer emphasized that the framers of the Enforcement Clause 
“sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision applicable to 
 
 235 Id. at 374 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
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the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.”246  Quoting South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, which involved the Enforcement Clause of the Fif-
teenth Amendment, he declared that Congress had the preroga-
tive to use “any rational means to effectuate the constitutional 
prohibition.”247  It was clear to Justice Breyer that the Americans 
with Disabilities Act was unquestionably a valid exercise of Con-
gress’s authority to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.  There-
fore, he would have upheld Congress’s purported abrogation of 
the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Garrett serves as fur-
ther evidence of the lack of deference shown to Congress in re-
cent years.  Garrett also contained another flaw.  The Court’s 
language about the pattern requirement was so unclear that it 
has led some to conclude that such documentation is required 
whenever Congress chooses to abrogate the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.248  Such an interpretation of the Court’s 
opinion would explain why the Court discounted examples of dis-
crimination by local governments.  Nevertheless, this interpreta-
tion makes no sense when taking into consideration the context 
of the Court’s language.  In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the 
Court upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which prohibited a 
broader swath of conduct than that directly forbidden by the Fif-
teenth Amendment.249  The Act’s substantive provisions were 
deemed valid enforcement measures because the prohibited state 
conduct, though not itself unconstitutional, had resulted in con-
stitutional violations in various instances.  Consequently, it 
would seem that the documentation of a pattern of unconstitu-
tional behavior by the states is required when Congress enacts 
prophylactic legislation that raises the substantive bar above the 
constitutional mandate.  Congress need not, however, provide 
such documentation when it merely provides a remedy for actual 
violations of the Constitution.  This line of reasoning leads to the 
conclusion that Congress is always free to abrogate the states’ 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, even without a pattern of un-
constitutional behavior by the states, as long as the substantive 
requirements of the underlying statute do not prohibit conduct 
that is not proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment itself. 
The Court’s opinion in Garrett, however, was very unclear.  
 
 246 Id. at 386 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966)). 
 247 Id. at 386 (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966)). 
 248 Joan Shinavski, The Eleventh Amendment Bars Private Individuals from Suing 
State Employers for Money Damages Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilites Act: 
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 40 DUQUESNE LAW REVIEW 
161–179 (2001). 
 249 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 337. 
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Since local governments are state actors for purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment, there was no reason for the Court to ignore 
evidence of discrimination by local governments.  While it is true 
that local governments do not enjoy the immunity that the Elev-
enth Amendment gives to the states, the pattern of discrimina-
tion documented by Congress does not belong in the abrogation 
calculus.  Instead, it is relevant only for demonstrating that the 
substantive requirements of the underlying prophylactic Act are 
necessary in order to prevent actual constitutional violations.  As 
Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissenting opinion, “the sub-
stantive obligation that the Equal Protection Clause creates ap-
plies to state and local governmental entities alike.”250  The same 
is true of the substantive obligations that the Americans with 
Disabilities Act imposes on government employers.  Since evi-
dence of past discrimination by governmental entities was only 
relevant for establishing that the Act’s prophylactic requirements 
were needed to deter actual violations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court was wrong to discount examples of dis-
crimination by local governments. 
The Court’s reliance on South Carolina v. Katzenbach was 
anomalous for yet another reason.  Chief Justice Rehnquist ex-
plained that the precedent was relevant because of the similari-
ties in the wording of Section Two of the Fifteenth Amendment 
and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.251  Nonetheless, 
he never mentioned that the two constitutional provisions, 
though similar to each other, are almost identical to Section Two 
of the Thirteenth Amendment as well.  The legislative enact-
ments upheld in Jones and Runyon pursuant to Section Two of 
the Thirteenth Amendment were certainly not “congruent” and 
“proportional” for purposes of Flores.  Those statutes swept far 
beyond the narrow requirements of the Thirteenth Amendment.  
The Court construed Congress’s power to enforce the Thirteenth 
Amendment very broadly in Jones and Runyon, and it has not 
provided a principled reason for giving an overly narrow con-
struction to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment in Flores, 
College Savings Bank, Florida Prepaid, Kimel, Morrison and 
Garrett. 
III. THE COURT’S RETREAT IN HIBBS, LANE AND GOODMAN 
A. Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs 
After Garrett was decided, it appeared as if the rigorous judi-
cial scrutiny applied to Enforcement Clause legislation would 
 
 250 Garrett,  531 U.S. at 378 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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continue to disrupt the enforcement of many other federal laws.  
The Americans with Disabilities Act, signed into law by Presi-
dent George H.W. Bush in 1990, was the sixth Act that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had found to be in excess of Congress’s power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.  Flores, College Savings 
Bank, Florida Prepaid, Kimel, Morrison and Garrett were all de-
cided within a five-year span.  For proponents of prophylactic leg-
islation, no end to the judicial overreaching seemed to be in sight.  
Nevertheless, that changed in 2003, when the Court issued its 
decision in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs.252  
In Hibbs, the Court determined that the Family and Medical 
Leave Act was a legitimate exercise of Congress’s Enforcement 
Clause authority.253 
The Family and Medical Leave Act, which was signed into 
law by President Bill Clinton in 1993, entitles eligible employees 
to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave annually for any of a 
variety of reasons.254  Aggrieved employees may seek both equi-
table relief and money damages against offending employers cov-
ered under the statute, including state employers.  An employee 
of the State of Nevada sued his employer in federal court for an 
alleged violation of the Act, seeking money damages in addition 
to injunctive and declaratory relief.  The Nevada Department of 
Human Resources contended that the Eleventh Amendment 
barred the suit because the Act, though a valid exercise of Con-
gress’s Article I power, was in excess of its authority to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Like the state defendants in Col-
lege Savings Bank, Florida Prepaid, Kimel and Garrett, the De-
partment believed that the rules of Seminole Tribe and Flores en-
titled it to the dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit.  Notwithstanding 
some apparent similarities, however, the Court’s ruling in Hibbs 
went the other way. 
In enacting the Family and Medical Leave Act, Congress re-
lied on both the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment.  Seminole Tribe, of course, prevented the 
plaintiff from relying on the Commerce Clause to sustain the 
Act’s purported abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, so the inquiry quickly turned to the question of 
whether the Act was a valid exercise of Congress’s Enforcement 
Clause power.  Among the purposes listed in the Act was the 
promotion of “equal employment opportunity for women and 
men” in a manner consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.255  
 
 252 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003). 
 253 Id. 
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Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Act was 
a valid exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, thereby enabling the plaintiff to proceed with his 
suit in federal court pursuant to the rule of Fitzpatrick. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the opinion of the 
Court in Hibbs, noted at the outset that Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment enables Congress to “enact so-called prophy-
lactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct, 
in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct.”256  Ex-
plaining that the Act aimed “to protect the right to be free from 
gender-based discrimination in the workplace,”257 he went on to 
say that heightened scrutiny applied to gender-based discrimina-
tion challenged on Equal Protection Clause grounds.  In order for 
a gender-based classification to withstand such scrutiny in court, 
it must “serv[e] important governmental objectives,” and “the dis-
criminatory means employed [must be] substantially related to 
the achievement of those objectives.”258  The Constitution does 
not permit the states to “rely on overbroad generalizations about 
the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and fe-
males.”259  Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that Congress had 
documented evidence of gender discrimination in the family-
leave context.  He pointed out that many states had provided 
women with maternity leave that exceeded the “period of physi-
cal disability due to pregnancy and childbirth” without offering a 
similar benefit to fathers.260  He declared that these “differential 
leave policies were not attributable to any differential physical 
needs of men and women, but rather to the pervasive sex-role 
stereotype that caring for family members is women’s work.”261 
The Court went on to assert that the discretionary nature of 
some family-leave programs had resulted in de facto gender dis-
crimination, providing a reasonable basis for Congress to con-
clude that “such discretionary family-leave programs would do 
little to combat the stereotypes about the roles of male and fe-
male employees.”262  There had also been instances of overt dis-
crimination, as “seven States had childcare leave provisions that 
applied to women only” and “Massachusetts required that notice 
of its leave provisions be posted only in ‘establishments in which 
females are employed.’”263 These cases of gender-based discrimi-
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 258 Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)). 
 259 Id. at 729 (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533). 
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nation convinced the Court that Congress was justified in relying 
on its Enforcement Clause power to pass the Family and Medical 
Leave Act, which provided men and women with an equal statu-
tory right to unpaid leave.  The Court distinguished Kimel and 
Garrett by emphasizing the difference between the rational basis 
test that applies to age and disability classifications and the 
heightened scrutiny that applies to gender classifications.264  
Since the standard for demonstrating the constitutionality of 
gender-based classifications is more difficult for the states to 
meet than the rationality standard applicable to classifications 
based on age and disability, it was easier for Congress to estab-
lish a pattern of unconstitutional gender discrimination by the 
states. 
It was also determined that the Family and Medical Leave 
Act was “congruent and proportional to the targeted violation.”265  
The Court reasoned that Congress had the authority to create 
“an across-the-board, routine employment benefit for all eligible 
employees” in order to “ensure that family-care leave would no 
longer be stigmatized as an inordinate drain on the workplace 
caused by female employees, and that employers could not evade 
leave obligations simply by hiring men.”266  Therefore, the Act 
was deemed a valid exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the 
Equal Protection Clause, permitting the plaintiff in Hibbs to pro-
ceed with his suit against the State of Nevada.  Since the under-
lying federal Act passed the “congruence and proportionality” 
test enunciated in Flores, the case was governed by Fitzpatrick, 
and the Eleventh Amendment did not preclude federal adjudica-
tory jurisdiction. 
The opinion of the Court, delivered by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, was joined by Justices O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg 
and Breyer.  In a short concurring opinion, Justice Souter noted 
that he joined the opinion of the Court without abandoning the 
dissenting positions expressed in Seminole Tribe, Florida Pre-
paid, Kimel and Garrett.267  He was joined by Justices Ginsburg 
and Breyer.  Justice Stevens, who concurred in the judgment, did 
not join the opinion of the Court because he was uncertain 
whether the Family and Medical Leave Act was “truly ‘needed to 
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment’” and had 
“never been convinced that an Act of Congress can amend the 
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Constitution.”268  He concurred in the judgment only because he 
viewed Nevada’s sovereign immunity defense as one based on 
judge-made common law, which Congress could abrogate pursu-
ant to its Commerce Clause authority.  He insisted that the Elev-
enth Amendment posed no barrier to the adjudication at issue in 
Hibbs because the plaintiff was a citizen of Nevada.  The Elev-
enth Amendment, of course, only states: “The Judicial power of 
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in 
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Sub-
jects of any Foreign State.”269  Justice Stevens construed the 
Eleventh Amendment to be nothing more than a limit on the di-
versity jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
Justice Scalia authored a dissenting opinion in which he de-
cried the nationwide reach of the remedy.  He declared that the 
inquiry should focus on “whether the State has itself engaged in 
discrimination sufficient to support the exercise of Congress’s 
prophylactic power.”270  In his view, Congress was only empow-
ered to apply prophylactic legislation to those particular states 
that had engaged in unconstitutional behavior.  Therefore, he 
would have dismissed the plaintiff’s suit in the absence of a con-
gressional determination that Nevada, as opposed to some states, 
had engaged in unconstitutional gender discrimination in the 
area of family and medical leave.271 
Justice Kennedy authored a separate dissenting opinion, 
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas.  He asserted that Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress the 
power to create an “entitlement program of its own design.”272  
While expressing the view that “[t]he Commerce Clause likely 
would permit the National Government to enact an entitlement 
program” such as the one created by the Family and Medical 
Leave Act, he insisted that the Act could not be sustained as a 
valid exercise of Congress’s Enforcement Clause authority.273  It 
was clear that he did not view the stereotypes described by the 
Court as evidence of unconstitutional discrimination by the 
states.  Justice Kennedy declared: 
Given the insufficiency of the evidence that States discriminated in 
the provision of family leave, the unfortunate fact that stereotypes 
about women continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem 
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would not alone support the charge that a State has engaged in a 
practice designed to deny its citizens the equal protection of the 
laws.274   
He contended that the states’ sovereign immunity “cannot be 
abrogated without documentation of a pattern of unconstitu-
tional acts by the States, and only then by a congruent and 
proportional remedy.”275 
Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion in Hibbs, like the opin-
ion of the Court in Garrett, did not clarify when the documenta-
tion requirement applies.  Although his language implies that 
Congress cannot abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment im-
munity in any instance without documenting a pattern of uncon-
stitutional activity, the context of that language indicates that 
the documentation requirement applies only when the underly-
ing federal statute imposes a higher standard on the states than 
that set by the Fourteenth Amendment itself.  The Family and 
Medical Leave Act undoubtedly does that.  Justice Kennedy did 
not address a situation in which Congress, seeking to deter viola-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment, acts to abrogate the states’ 
Eleventh Amendment immunity in cases where the plaintiffs’ 
complaints allege unconstitutional conduct rather than conduct 
that merely violates a federal prophylactic statute.  If Congress 
were to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in 
cases involving suits against the states for actual violations of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, it is unlikely that the documenta-
tion requirement would apply.  It would make no sense for the 
Court to say that Congress must wait for a pattern of unconstitu-
tional activity to develop before allowing private lawsuits to re-
dress the relevant violations.  The documentation requirement, 
therefore, appears to be applicable only when Congress attempts 
to demonstrate that prophylactic legislation, which raises the bar 
above the requirements of the Constitution, is needed to deter ac-
tual violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The alternative 
understanding would be even more troubling than the status 
quo, as it would be utterly ridiculous to require that Congress al-
low some unconstitutional conduct to go unaddressed before 
permitting aggrieved individuals to sue their respective states. 
In any event, the Court clearly appears to be showing more 
deference to Congress’s judgment when the challenged prophy-
lactic legislation is designed to deter discrimination based on 
race or gender.  Hibbs was an important victory for equality in 
the workplace, and it remains to be seen whether the principles 
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underlying that decision will be sufficient to sustain other pro-
phylactic statutes.  While it is unfortunate that a similar respect 
for legislative judgment was not shown in Morrison, it is gener-
ally true that the Violence Against Women Act was directed at 
private conduct rather than state action.  For this reason, the 
constitutional prospects for prophylactic legislation designed to 
combat state-sanctioned gender discrimination appear to be good. 
B. Tennessee v. Lane 
A year after the Hibbs decision, the U.S. Supreme Court was 
called upon to decide whether Title II of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act constituted a valid exercise of Congress’s power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.276  Title II provides that “no 
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such dis-
ability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the bene-
fits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be 
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”277  In Tennessee 
v. Lane, the Court found Title II to be a valid exercise of Con-
gress’s prophylactic power as applied to “the class of cases impli-
cating the fundamental right of access to the courts.”278 
Two paraplegics sued the State of Tennessee and several 
Tennessee counties, alleging that they had been denied access to 
the state judicial system due to their disabilities.  George Lane 
alleged that he was required to appear on the second floor of a 
courthouse that lacked an elevator in order to answer a set of 
criminal charges.279  Apparently, he got to the courtroom only af-
ter crawling up two flights of stairs.  When he returned to the 
courthouse for another hearing, he was arrested and jailed for 
failure to appear after refusing to crawl again or to be carried to 
the courtroom by police officers.280  Beverly Jones, who was a cer-
tified court reporter, claimed that she was denied both work op-
portunities and chances to participate in the judicial process be-
cause of inadequate accommodations at various county 
courthouses.281  The State of Tennessee contended that the Elev-
enth Amendment barred the suit, relying heavily on the Court’s 
prior decision in Garrett. 
Justice Stevens, who delivered the opinion of the Court in 
Lane, explained that the Court’s opinion in Garrett had noted 
that most of the instances of state-sponsored discrimination 
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 279 Id. at 1982. 
 280 Id. at 1983. 
 281 Id. 
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against the disabled documented by Congress “related to ‘the 
provision of public services and public accommodations, which 
areas are addressed in Titles II and III,’ rather than Title I.”282  
That was among the reasons why Garrett held that “Title I’s 
broad remedial scheme was insufficiently targeted to remedy or 
prevent unconstitutional discrimination in public employ-
ment.”283  Nevertheless, because of the differences between the 
substantive provisions of Titles I and II, Garrett left open the 
possibility that Title II was a valid exercise of Congress’s power 
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court likewise emphasized that Title II was enacted to 
enforce constitutional guarantees other than the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.  Although governmental discrimination against the 
disabled only triggers a rationality analysis for purposes of the 
Equal Protection Clause, the Court declared that Title II sought 
to “enforce a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees, in-
fringements of which are subject to more searching judicial re-
view.”284  For instance, the Due Process Clause guarantees to a 
criminal defendant the “right to be present at all stages of the 
trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the pro-
ceedings.”285  That right is also secured by the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which is incorporated within the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Due 
Process Clause also requires the states to provide certain civil 
litigants with a “‘meaningful opportunity to be heard’ by remov-
ing obstacles to their full participation in judicial proceedings.”286  
The Jury Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment, applicable to the 
states by virtue of the Due Process Clause, guarantees to crimi-
nal defendants the right to “trial by a jury composed of a fair 
cross section of the community.”287  Disabled persons are, of 
course, a part of that community.  The First Amendment, which 
is also incorporated within the Due Process Clause, secures to 
members of the public “a right of access to criminal proceed-
ings.”288  Consequently, the rationale that controlled in Garrett 
was inapplicable in Lane. 
Proceeding to the documentation analysis, the Court noted 
that “[a] report before Congress showed that some 76% of public 
services and programs housed in state-owned buildings were in-
accessible to and unusable by persons with disabilities, even tak-
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ing into account the possibility that the services and programs 
might be restructured or relocated to other parts of the build-
ings.”289  The Court stated: 
[Congress’s] appointed task force heard numerous examples of the ex-
clusion of persons with disabilities from state judicial services and 
programs, including exclusion of persons with visual impairments and 
hearing impairments from jury service, failure of state and local gov-
ernments to provide interpretive services for the hearing impaired, 
failure to permit the testimony of adults with developmental disabili-
ties in abuse cases, and failure to make courtrooms accessible to wit-
nesses with physical disabilities.290 
These findings were clearly sufficient to satisfy the need for evi-
dence of unconstitutional discrimination by the states. 
Comparing the circumstances in Lane to those that had been 
present in Hibbs, the Court asserted that Title II was aimed at 
the enforcement of a variety of constitutional rights “that call for 
a standard of judicial review at least as searching, and in some 
cases more searching, than the standard that applies to sex-
based classifications.”291  The Court also made it clear that it did 
not have to “consider Title II, with its wide variety of applica-
tions, as an undifferentiated whole.”292  Instead, the inquiry was 
limited to the question of whether the Enforcement Clause pro-
vided Congress with the authority to subject unconsenting states 
to suits for money damages for failing to give the disabled access 
to the courts.  Since the Court found Title II to be valid Enforce-
ment Clause legislation as applied to “the class of cases implicat-
ing the accessibility of judicial services,” other applications of the 
statute were deemed immaterial to the outcome of the case.293  It 
was likewise noted that Garrett, which had severed Title I from 
Title II for purposes of the Enforcement Clause inquiry, demon-
strated that courts were not required to “examine the full 
breadth of the statute all at once.”294 
Title II was viewed as “congruent and proportional to its ob-
ject of enforcing the right of access to the courts” because it “re-
quire[d] only ‘reasonable modifications’ that would not funda-
mentally alter the nature of the service provided, and only when 
the individual seeking modification [was] otherwise eligible for 
the service.”295  Since the case at issue in Lane implicated addi-
tional constitutional rights secured by the Fourteenth Amend-
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ment, the Court saw no need to decide whether Title II’s duty to 
accommodate was in excess of Congress’s Section Five authority 
as applied to the class of cases implicating only the Equal Protec-
tion Clause’s prohibition of irrational discrimination against dis-
abled persons.296  Congress clearly stated its intention to abro-
gate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted 
the Americans with Disabilities Act.297  Therefore, pursuant to 
the Court’s prior decisions in Fitzpatrick and Hibbs, the plaintiffs 
in Lane were able to proceed with their Title II actions in federal 
court. 
The opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice Stevens, was 
joined by Justices O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.  In a 
concurring opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Souter de-
cried the Court’s prior decision in Buck v. Bell,298 which sustained 
the constitutionality of the “once-pervasive practice of involuntar-
ily sterilizing those with mental disabilities.”299  He declared that 
“the judiciary itself has endorsed the basis for some of the very 
discrimination subject to congressional remedy under § 5.”300  
Justice Ginsburg, who was joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, 
authored a concurring opinion in which she insisted that it was 
“not conducive to a harmonious federal system to require Con-
gress, before it exercises authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, essentially to indict each State for disregarding the 
equal-citizenship stature of persons with disabilities.”301  She 
went on to state that there was no need to “disarm a National 
Legislature for resisting an adversarial approach to lawmaking 
better suited to the courtroom.”302  Justice Ginsburg concluded 
her concurrence by expressing her approval of the Court’s deci-
sion to defer to Congress’s judgment in cases implicating the 
right of access to judicial proceedings. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored a dissenting opinion, 
joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas.  In his view, the Court’s 
decision in Lane could not be reconciled with Garrett.  Relying on 
Garrett, he stated that the first step of Flores’ “congruence and 
proportionality” analysis was to “identify with some precision the 
scope of the constitutional right at issue.”303  The second step, ac-
cording to Chief Justice Rehnquist, was to “examine whether 
 
 296 Id. at 1994 n.20. 
 297 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2000). 
 298 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 299 Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1995 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 300 Id. 
 301 Id. at 1996 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 302 Id. at 1997. 
 303 Id. at 1998 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. 
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Congress identified a history and pattern of violations” of the 
constitutional right being enforced.304  Finally, he contended that 
the last step of the Flores inquiry required the Court to deter-
mine “whether the rights and remedies created by Title II [were] 
congruent and proportional to the constitutional rights it pur-
port[ed] to enforce and the record of constitutional violations ad-
duced by Congress.”305  Chief Justice Rehnquist was clearly con-
vinced that Garrett required the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ suits 
against the State of Tennessee. 
Beginning with the first step of the analysis, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist acknowledged that “the task of identifying the scope of 
the relevant constitutional protection” in Lane was difficult be-
cause Title II purported to “enforce a panoply of constitutional 
rights of disabled persons.”306  Since the Court upheld Title II as 
applied to “the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of 
access to the courts,” he viewed the proper inquiry as being lim-
ited to the scope of those due process rights specifically related to 
access to judicial proceedings.307  Moving on to the second step, 
he criticized the majority for setting out on “a wide-ranging ac-
count of societal discrimination against the disabled” instead of 
limiting its examination of constitutional violations to the spe-
cific due process right on which it relied to uphold Title II.308  He 
indicated that such a broad examination of the documentation 
was especially inappropriate in light of the Court’s decision to 
evaluate Title II only as applied to the circumstances in Lane.  
Expressing doubt that the statute was designed to deter actual 
constitutional violations, he declared that no person “has a con-
stitutional right to make his way into a courtroom without any 
external assistance” and that “[a] violation of due process occurs 
only when a person is actually denied the constitutional right to 
access a given judicial proceeding.”309 
Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to the third step of the Flo-
res analysis and insisted that Title II was out of proportion with 
Congress’s objective of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
substantive provisions.  He stated that the Court was obligated 
to measure the full breadth of Title II’s coverage against the 
scope of the specific constitutional rights that it purported to en-
force.  In his view, the Court’s “as applied” approach was inap-
propriate in the Enforcement Clause context because it converted 
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the Flores inquiry into a test of whether the Court could “con-
ceive of a hypothetical statute narrowly tailored enough to con-
stitute valid prophylactic legislation.”310  He contended that the 
majority’s analysis would allow Congress to “simply rely on the 
courts to sort out which hypothetical applications of an undiffer-
entiated statute, such as Title II, may be enforced against the 
States.”311  This, he said, would eliminate any incentive for Con-
gress to draft Enforcement Clause legislation narrowly “for the 
purpose of remedying or deterring actual constitutional viola-
tions.”312 
Justice Scalia also authored a dissenting opinion.313  He 
abandoned his support for Flores’ “congruence and proportional-
ity” standard, calling it “a standing invitation to judicial arbi-
trariness and policy-driven decisionmaking.”314  Instead, he pro-
posed a test even more restrictive of Congress’s authority to 
enforce the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  He asserted that “[n]othing in § 5 allows Congress to go 
beyond the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to proscribe, 
prevent, or ‘remedy’ conduct that does not itself violate any provi-
sion of the Fourteenth Amendment.”315  In his view, Section Five 
only “authorizes Congress to create a cause of action through 
which the citizen may vindicate his [or her] Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights.”316  Addressing the principle of stare decisis, he 
noted that most of the pre-Hibbs decisions sustaining prophylac-
tic legislation under the Civil War Amendments had “involved 
congressional measures that were directed exclusively against, or 
were used in the particular case to remedy, racial discrimina-
tion.”317  Jones was among the cases cited by Justice Scalia to il-
lustrate this point.  He contended that when many of those ear-
lier cases were decided, “the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
include the many guarantees that it now provides,” creating a 
situation in which “it did not appear to be a massive expansion of 
congressional power to interpret § 5 broadly.”318 
Consequently, Justice Scalia declared that he would only ap-
ply a permissive Enforcement Clause standard to “congressional 
measures designed to remedy racial discrimination by the 
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States.”319  Referring to his prior dissent in Hibbs, he made it 
clear that he was not abandoning “the requirement that Con-
gress may impose prophylactic § 5 legislation only upon those 
particular States in which there has been an identified history of 
relevant constitutional violations.”320  Citing Morrison, he stated 
his intention to “adhere to the requirement that the prophylactic 
remedy predicated upon such state violations must be directed 
against the States or state actors rather than the public at 
large.”321  Assuming that those requirements were met and that 
no other constitutional provision was violated, Justice Scalia as-
serted that he would “leave it to Congress, under constraints no 
tighter than those of the Necessary and Proper Clause, to decide 
what measures are appropriate under § 5 to prevent or remedy 
racial discrimination by the States.”322  Nonetheless, he empha-
sized that he would not show Congress such extensive deference 
in other Enforcement Clause contexts and that it was “past time 
to draw a line limiting the uncontrolled spread of a well-
intentioned textual distortion.”323  Justice Thomas, who joined 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent but not that of Justice Scalia, 
authored a short dissenting opinion in which he expressed the 
view that Hibbs had been wrongly decided and made it clear that 
he was not relying on that precedent to reach his conclusion in 
Lane.324 
C. United States v. Georgia 
In 2006, the Court decided its first case involving the En-
forcement Clause under newly confirmed Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts, Jr., who was chosen by President George W. Bush to re-
place Chief Justice Rehnquist.  Surprisingly, United States v. 
Georgia (hereinafter referred to as “Goodman”) was a unanimous 
decision.325  Justice Scalia, who delivered the opinion of the 
Court, explained that the question for consideration was 
“whether a disabled inmate in a state prison may sue the State 
for money damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990.”326  Title II states that “no qualified individ-
ual . . . shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from par-
 
 319 Id. at 2012. 
 320 Id. 
 321 Id. 
 322 Id. at 2013. 
 323 Id. 
 324 Id. at 2013 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 325 United States v. Georgia (Goodman), 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006).  Tony Goodman was 
the petitioner in No. 04-1236.  The United States, the petitioner in No. 04-1203, “inter-
vened to defend the constitutionality of Title II’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity.”  
Id. at 880.  
 326 Id. at 878; 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (2000). 
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ticipation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, 
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination 
by any such entity.”327  Relying on the Court’s prior decision in 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey,328 Justice 
Scalia noted that it was clear that the term “public entity” was 
broad enough to include state prisons.329  Congress’s intent to ab-
rogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity was, of course, 
clearly expressed in the Act.330 
Tony Goodman, a paraplegic inmate in a Georgia prison, 
sued the State of Georgia and the Georgia Department of Correc-
tions, in addition to several individual prison officials, under both 
Title II and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.331  He sought “both injunctive relief 
and money damages against all defendants.”332  He alleged that 
“he had injured himself in attempting to transfer from his wheel-
chair to the shower or toilet on his own and [that], on several 
other occasions, he had been forced to sit in his own feces and 
urine while prison officials refused to assist him in cleaning up 
the waste.”333  In addition, Goodman claimed that he had been 
denied access to physical therapy, medical treatment and other 
services on account of his disability. 
It was noted at the outset that “Goodman’s claims for money 
damages against the State under Title II were evidently based, at 
least in large part, on conduct that independently violated the 
provisions of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”334  This was due 
to the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual 
punishment, which was incorporated within the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.335  Georgia did not dispute 
Goodman’s assertion that the same alleged conduct that violated 
the Eighth Amendment also violated Title II of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act.336 
Writing for the Court in Goodman and relying on his own 
prior dissent in Lane, Justice Scalia explained that no member of 
the Court doubted Congress’s Section Five authority to create 
“private remedies against the States for actual violations” of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.337  The Court went on to state that, “in-
 
 327 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). 
 328 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998). 
 329 Goodman, 126 S. Ct. at 879. 
 330 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2000). 
 331 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165, 1983. 
 332 Goodman, 126 S. Ct. at 879. 
 333 Id. 
 334 Id. at 881. 
 335 Louisiana ex. rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947). 
 336 Goodman, 126 S. Ct. at 881–82. 
 337 Id. at 881. 
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sofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for damages 
against the States for conduct that actually violates the Four-
teenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign 
immunity.”338  Consequently, it was determined that the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had “erred in dismiss-
ing those of Goodman’s Title II claims that were based on such 
unconstitutional conduct.”339  The Supreme Court declined to ad-
dress the question of whether Congress’s purported abrogation of 
sovereign immunity was valid as to the class of alleged conduct 
that “violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,” leaving it to the applicable inferior federal courts to con-
duct the “congruence and proportionality” inquiry in the first in-
stance.340 
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, emphasized that the Court’s focus on Goodman’s 
Eighth Amendment claims arose “simply from the fact that those 
[were] the only constitutional violations [that] the Eleventh Cir-
cuit [had] found him to have alleged properly.”341  He asserted 
that “the history of mistreatment leading to Congress’ decision to 
extend Title II’s protections to prison inmates was not limited to 
violations of the Eighth Amendment,”342 and that courts had “re-
viewed myriad other types of claims by disabled prisoners, such 
as allegations of the abridgment of religious liberties, undue cen-
sorship, interference with access to the judicial process, and pro-
cedural due process violations.”343  Justice Stevens concluded his 
concurring opinion by explaining that the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals would, on remand, have an opportunity to con-
sider all of the potential Fourteenth Amendment violations for 
purposes of both Goodman’s complaint and the Flores inquiry.344 
Goodman cleared up much of the confusion created by the 
Court’s poorly written opinion in Garrett.  First of all, it now 
seems obvious that the documentation requirement applies only 
when Congress prohibits conduct which does not itself violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and that Congress clearly has the 
power to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in 
order to redress Fourteenth Amendment violations.  Secondly, in 
light of Lane and Goodman, litigants who allege conduct that ac-
tually violates the Fourteenth Amendment are likely to circum-
vent the Eleventh Amendment hurdle, assuming that Congress’s 
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intent to abrogate sovereign immunity is clear, even if the under-
lying statutes do not satisfy the “congruence and proportionality” 
standard as applied to the broader class of cases which do not in-
volve constitutional violations. 
These principles are consistent with Justice Scalia’s dissent 
in Lane, in which he conceded that Congress has the power to ab-
rogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in order to re-
dress actual Fourteenth Amendment violations.  It is worthy of 
note that Justice Scalia did not join Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
dissenting opinion in Lane, where the Chief Justice contended 
that the Court’s “as applied” approach to the case was erroneous.  
The Chief Justice found that it would permit Congress to “simply 
rely on the courts to sort out which hypothetical applications of 
an undifferentiated statute, such as Title II, may be enforced 
against the States.”345  Justice Scalia authored his own dissent in 
Lane, expressing the view that Congress’s ability to prohibit 
more than the Fourteenth Amendment itself prohibits should be 
limited to cases involving racial discrimination. 
While it is true that most of the Court’s early decisions up-
holding sweeping Enforcement Clause legislation involved con-
gressional efforts to deter racial discrimination, Justice Scalia 
provided no principled reason for subjecting prophylactic legisla-
tion involving other Fourteenth Amendment rights to a greater 
degree of judicial scrutiny.  When viewed in the context of Jones 
and Runyon, the “congruence and proportionality” standard 
enunciated in Flores is virtually inexplicable.  Therefore, neither 
the restrictive test advocated by Justice Scalia, nor the slightly 
less rigorous test currently used by the Court to assess the con-
stitutionality of Enforcement Clause legislation, is consistent 
with the Court’s pre-Flores precedents. 
In Jones, the Court sustained a broad civil rights statute un-
der Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment on the ground 
that “the Enabling Clause of that Amendment empowered Con-
gress to do much more” than the self-executing Section One ac-
complished in the absence of additional federal legislation.346  In 
Runyon, the Court reaffirmed Congress’s authority to enact such 
legislation.347  There was no indication that Section Two legisla-
tion had to be limited to the purpose of remedying or deterring 
actual Thirteenth Amendment violations. 
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court declared that “the 
McCulloch v. Maryland standard is the measure of what consti-
 
 345 Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2005 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 346 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968). 
 347 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976). 
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tutes ‘appropriate legislation’ under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”348  McCulloch construed the Necessary and Proper 
Clause as an extensive grant of legislative authority and rejected 
an argument for a narrow reading of that provision.349  Likening 
the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Necessary and Proper Clause as construed in McCulloch, the 
Court explained in Morgan that “§ 5 is a positive grant of legisla-
tive power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in de-
termining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”350  The construction 
given to the Enforcement Clause was clearly one that showed a 
substantial degree of deference to the judgments made by Con-
gress. 
The Court likewise adopted a broad construction of Section 
Two of the Fifteenth Amendment in South Carolina v. Katzen-
bach.  In that case, the Court stated that “[t]he basic test to be 
applied in a case involving § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is the 
same as in all cases concerning the express powers of Congress 
with relation to the reserved powers of the States.”351  This was, 
of course, a direct reference to Chief Justice Marshall’s language 
in McCulloch.  It was further noted that the Court had “echoed 
his language in describing each of the Civil War Amendments.”352 
Unfortunately, the Court has not seen fit to echo the lan-
guage of Chief Justice Marshall in recent times, particularly with 
regard to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The utter 
lack of deference shown to Congress in Flores, College Savings 
Bank, Florida Prepaid, Kimel, Morrison and Garrett is a far cry 
from the rationale underlying the Court’s decision in McCulloch.  
Furthermore, the Court has made no attempt to distinguish its 
recent Enforcement Clause holdings from Jones and Runyon.  
Since the Thirteenth Amendment itself restricts private entities, 
it is easy to understand why Jones and Runyon did not call for a 
different result in Morrison.  The Fourteenth Amendment, of 
course, only limits state action, providing the Court with a logical 
reason to view the Violence Against Women Act as an excess of 
Congress’s Enforcement Clause authority.  That Act was conced-
edly directed against private actors.  This is true despite the fact 
that it was designed, at least in part, to address the problem of 
gender discrimination in the criminal justice system.  That is not 
to say that Morrison was correctly decided, but it does illustrate 
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why the Court’s Thirteenth Amendment precedents were never 
used to inform the Court’s Enforcement Clause inquiry.  Never-
theless, that line of reasoning was wholly inapplicable in Flores, 
College Savings Bank, Florida Prepaid, Kimel and Garrett. 
In Garrett, the Court noted that “Section 2 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment is virtually identical to § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”353  Chief Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the 
opinion of the Court in Garrett, described Title I of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act as an excess of Congress’s power to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  He viewed the Voting Rights Act 
upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach as a “limited remedial 
scheme designed to guarantee meaningful enforcement of the Fif-
teenth Amendment.”354  Contending that Title I was not a “lim-
ited remedial scheme” akin to the Voting Rights Act, he pur-
ported to rely on South Carolina v. Katzenbach to justify the 
invalidation of Title I for Enforcement Clause purposes.355  That 
precedent, however, exhibited a large measure of deference to 
Congress, making the Court’s reliance on it in Garrett all the 
more ironic. 
Since the Court relied on a precedent involving the Fifteenth 
Amendment to justify a narrow construction of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Enforcement Clause, there is no reason why the 
Court should not also use the relevant Thirteenth Amendment 
precedents to inform the Fourteenth Amendment inquiry.  The 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments restrict only governmen-
tal entities, while the Thirteenth Amendment is directed at pri-
vate action.  Nonetheless, the Enforcement Clauses of the three 
Civil War Amendments are virtually identical.  The self-
executing provisions of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments are much narrower than the protections provided by Sec-
tion One of the Fourteenth Amendment.  If anything, Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment should be given a broader 
construction than the Enforcement Clauses of the other two Civil 
War Amendments.  The Court, however, has disregarded the def-
erential standard applied in Jones and Runyon when interpret-
ing the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Lane, acknowledged the defer-
ence shown to Congress with regard to the deterrence of racial 
discrimination.  Nevertheless, he insisted that he would give 
Congress such latitude in that limited context only because of 
stare decisis.356  He never explained why Congress’s authority to 
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enforce other Fourteenth Amendment rights should be more cir-
cumscribed, aside from highlighting his own unwillingness to ex-
pand federal legislative jurisdiction. 
Any objective observer must acknowledge that Congress’s 
authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
not unlimited.  It is true that Oregon v. Mitchell357 “found to be 
beyond the § 5 power [a federal statute] that lowered the voting 
age from twenty-one to eighteen in state elections.”358  Mitchell, 
of course, preceded the adoption of the Twenty-Sixth Amend-
ment.  Nevertheless, most of the pre-Flores precedents interpret-
ing the Enforcement Clauses of the Civil War Amendments gen-
erally applied a standard consistent with that described in 
McCulloch, and the Court’s recent departure from that trend is 
unfortunate.  The Court certainly did not apply such a deferen-
tial standard in Flores, College Savings Bank, Florida Prepaid, 
Kimel, Morrison and Garrett.  Perhaps Hibbs, Lane and Good-
man represent the beginning of a larger retreat on the part of the 
Court.  Since the Constitution grants the enforcement power to 
Congress rather than to the courts, one can only hope that the 
pendulum is beginning to swing back in the direction of those 
elected by the people of the United States. 
IV. THE COURT’S ASSERTION OF ITS OWN PROPHYLACTIC POWER 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment states that “[t]he 
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article.”359  Nothing in the Constitution says 
anything about entrusting a similar power to the federal courts.  
Notwithstanding this reality, however, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has sometimes prescribed prophylactic rules of its own. 
Among the most famous prophylactic rules created by the 
Court is the one requiring that Miranda warnings be given to a 
criminal suspect prior to the commencement of custodial interro-
gation.  Before custodial interrogation can begin, a suspect must 
be verbally warned that he or she “has the right to remain silent, 
that anything he [or she] says can be used against him [or her] in 
a court of law, that he [or she] has the right to the presence of an 
attorney, and that if he [or she] cannot afford an attorney one 
will be appointed for him [or her] prior to any questioning if he 
[or she] so desires.”360  These warnings are required under the 
Court’s 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona.361  Confessions ob-
 
 357 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
 358 Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2012 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 359 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 360 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). 
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tained in violation of Miranda cannot be admitted into evidence 
as a part of the prosecution’s case-in-chief against the defen-
dant.362 
The warning requirement enunciated in Miranda is a pro-
phylactic rule designed to enforce the Self-Incrimination Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment.  The Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, of course, incorporates the Self-
Incrimination Clause and makes it applicable to the states.363  
Prior to Miranda, the Court evaluated the admissibility of a sus-
pect’s confession, for constitutional purposes, under a “voluntari-
ness test.”364  There are two distinct bases for the requirement 
that confessions be voluntary in order to admit them into evi-
dence.  The first basis, recognized in Bram v. United States, is 
the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.365  The 
second basis, discussed in Brown v. Mississippi, is the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.366  It is worthy of note 
that the Fifth Amendment contains its own Due Process Clause, 
providing a similar voluntariness protection to federal defen-
dants.367  Nevertheless, the Court ultimately became convinced 
that new custodial interrogation techniques had begun to blur 
the line between voluntary and involuntary confessions, requir-
ing more “concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement 
agencies and courts to follow.”368  Therefore, the Court created 
the prophylactic exclusionary rule of Miranda, barring the ad-
mission of confessions made during custodial interrogation before 
the giving of the warnings. 
Two years after Miranda was decided, Congress enacted 18 
U.S.C. § 3501.369  The statute was designed to alter the rule of 
Miranda in criminal prosecutions brought by the United States 
or the District of Columbia.  Under Miranda, the required warn-
ings had to be given in order for a suspect’s confession made dur-
ing custodial interrogation to be introduced as evidence by the 
prosecution at trial.  Section 3501(a) stated that, “[i]n any crimi-
nal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of 
Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall 
be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.”370  Section 
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3501(e) defined the word “confession” as “any confession of guilt 
of any criminal offense or any self-incriminating statement made 
or given orally or in writing.”371  The factors to be used by the 
trial judge to determine whether a given confession was volun-
tary were enumerated in § 3501(b).  These factors included all 
relevant “circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, 
including . . . the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment 
of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after ar-
rest and before arraignment . . . .”372  Inquiries were also man-
dated to determine 
whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he 
was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the 
confession, . . . whether or not such defendant was advised or knew 
that he was not required to make any statement and that any such 
statement could be used against him, . . . whether or not such defen-
dant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assis-
tance of counsel; and . . . whether or not such defendant was without 
the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such con-
fession.373   
Finally, § 3501(b) made it clear that the presence or absence of 
any of the enumerated factors was not necessarily “conclusive on 
the issue of voluntariness of the confession.”374 
The U.S. Supreme Court was ultimately called upon to de-
cide whether § 3501 was valid federal legislation in Dickerson v. 
United States.375  Charles Thomas Dickerson was indicted for 
several offenses under Title 18 of the United States Code, includ-
ing “bank robbery, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and using 
a firearm in the course of committing a crime of violence . . . .”376  
Prior to his trial, he moved for the suppression of a statement 
that he had made during a custodial interrogation session at a 
Federal Bureau of Investigation field office, contending that no 
one had given him Miranda warnings before the questioning 
commenced.  Although the District Court granted his motion, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed on inter-
locutory appeal by the Government, holding that the matter was 
governed by § 3501 rather than by Miranda.377  The Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that Congress had the authority to substitute 
§ 3501’s voluntariness test for the prophylactic warning rule be-
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cause Miranda was not a constitutional holding.  The U.S. Su-
preme Court granted certiorari, however, and ultimately re-
versed the decision of the Court of Appeals.378 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the opinion of the 
Court in Dickerson, explained that “Congress retains the ulti-
mate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules 
of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitu-
tion.”379  Citing Flores, he declared that Congress did not have 
the power to legislatively supersede the Court’s decisions “inter-
preting and applying the Constitution.”380  The outcome of the 
case was left to turn on the question of “whether the Miranda 
Court announced a constitutional rule or merely exercised its su-
pervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of con-
gressional direction.”381 
Moving on to address the critical issue, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist made it clear that Miranda had announced a constitu-
tional rule that Congress could not alter.  He explained that the 
Miranda Court had 
emphasized that it could not foresee “the potential alternatives for 
protecting the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the 
States,” and [that] it [had] accordingly opined that the Constitution 
would not preclude legislative solutions that differed from the pre-
scribed Miranda warnings but which were “at least as effective in ap-
prising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a con-
tinuous opportunity to exercise it.”382 
Nevertheless, it was likewise noted that the Miranda Court had 
“concluded that something more than the totality test was neces-
sary” to enforce the Self-Incrimination Clause.383  Since § 3501 
reinstated the totality of the circumstances test without provid-
ing additional protection, it was found to be unconstitutional. 
Another reason relied on by the Court to assert the constitu-
tional status of Miranda was the fact that the warning require-
ment had been applied to state prosecutions.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court, of course, does not have “a supervisory power over the 
courts of the several States,” and its authority with respect to 
state criminal proceedings is “limited to enforcing the commands 
of the United States Constitution.”384  Consequently, Miranda’s 
direct application to the states meant that it was a constitutional 
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threshold to be applied uniformly to both the states and the fed-
eral government, not simply an exercise of the Court’s supervi-
sory authority over the federal courts. 
Finally, the Court rejected the Government’s contention that 
the exceptions carved into Miranda’s exclusionary rule had un-
dermined its constitutional status.  Such exceptions included the 
rule enunciated in Oregon v. Hass, which held that a confession 
obtained in violation of Miranda may be used to impeach the de-
fendant’s trial testimony if he or she takes the stand, assuming 
that the confession was otherwise voluntary.385  Another excep-
tion relied on by the United States was the rule announced in 
New York v. Quarles, which permitted the admission of state-
ments made by a detained suspect in response to police question-
ing that was deemed to be necessary to protect the public from 
immediate danger.386  The Court declared that these exceptions 
to Miranda’s exclusionary rule did not destroy its status as a 
constitutional rule.  Instead, the Court asserted that “no consti-
tutional rule is immutable.”387  Because the Court found that 
Miranda was a constitutional precedent, it governed the result in 
Dickerson.  Explaining that “Miranda has become embedded in 
routine police practice to the point where the warnings have be-
come part of our national culture,” the Court declined the Gov-
ernment’s invitation to overrule Miranda.388  Therefore, Congress 
was without the constitutional authority to enact § 3501. 
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kennedy and 
O’Connor joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion.389  
Justice Scalia authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice 
Thomas.390  Questioning the Court’s authority to invalidate 
§ 3501, Justice Scalia characterized the Court’s decision in 
Dickerson as an assertion of “the power, not merely to apply the 
Constitution but to expand it, imposing what it regards as useful 
‘prophylactic’ restrictions upon Congress and the States.”391  He 
insisted that, since Miranda, the Court had “interpreted that de-
cision as having announced, not the circumstances in which cus-
todial interrogation runs afoul of the Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendment, but rather only ‘prophylactic’ rules that go beyond 
the right against compelled self-incrimination.”392  Relying on 
Quarles, he declared that the warnings prescribed by Miranda 
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were “not themselves rights protected by the Constitution.”393  
Quoting the Court’s prior decision in Oregon v. Elstad, Justice 
Scalia explained: “Miranda’s preventive medicine provides a rem-
edy even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable consti-
tutional harm.”394 
Seeking to further illustrate his view that the decision in 
Dickerson was an excess of the Court’s authority, Justice Scalia 
contended that “[w]here the Constitution has wished to lodge in 
one of the branches of the Federal Government some limited 
power to supplement its guarantees, it has said so.”395  That 
statement, of course, was a reference to Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment.  He went on to state that “[t]he power with 
which the Court would endow itself under a ‘prophylactic’ justifi-
cation for Miranda goes far beyond what it has permitted Con-
gress to do under authority of that text.”396  Justice Scalia as-
serted that while congressional action under the Enforcement 
Clause could be used only to deter actual violations of the Consti-
tution, the Court’s “power to embellish” permitted it to prescribe 
prophylactic measures against “foolhardy” confessions as well as 
“constitutionally prohibited compelled confessions.”397  In so stat-
ing, he referred to the “congruence and proportionality” test es-
tablished in Flores. 
Notwithstanding the observations made by Justice Scalia in 
Dickerson, the prophylactic rule enunciated by the Court in 
Miranda would likely pass Flores’ “congruence and proportional-
ity” test if it were enacted by Congress pursuant to Section Five 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court created Miranda’s ex-
clusionary rule to deter actual violations of the Self-
Incrimination Clause, which is incorporated within the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Nevertheless, it 
was mandated by a judicial decision rather than by federal legis-
lation.  Even though the Enforcement Clause gives the prophy-
lactic power to Congress, the Court has chosen to seize that 
power for itself.  Since Dickerson was a federal case, the Four-
teenth Amendment was not applicable and the Fifth Amend-
ment’s application was direct.  Despite that fact, it is clear that 
the exclusionary rule’s application in state cases influenced the 
Court’s decision.  In light of Miranda and Dickerson, it is appar-
ent that the Court has confused its own duty to give effect to the 
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment in a spe-
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cific case with Congress’s power to enforce those provisions by 
enacting prophylactic legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Judiciary’s assault on Congress’s power to en-
force the Fourteenth Amendment threatens the rights of Ameri-
cans all across the country.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent de-
cisions limiting Congress’s Enforcement Clause authority are 
particularly troubling in light of the Court’s reaffirmation of its 
own prophylactic power in Dickerson.  In spite of the decisions 
sustaining sweeping legislation under Section Two of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, the Court has inexplicably given Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment a much more narrow con-
struction.  While it cannot be doubted that each of the Civil War 
Amendments provides a unique scope of substantive protection, 
the Court has never explained why these similarly worded en-
forcement provisions have been given such drastically different 
constructions. 
Legislation to enforce one constitutional guarantee, of 
course, cannot itself conflict with another.  For instance, Con-
gress’s authority to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment cannot be 
used to require the states to make race the “predominant factor” 
in redistricting decisions.  Under Miller v. Johnson,398 the Equal 
Protection Clause forbids the use of race as the “predominant fac-
tor” for purposes related to the composition of legislative dis-
tricts.399  Congress does not have the authority to authorize viola-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment.400  Legislative enactments 
designed to enforce the Civil War Amendments, like all other en-
actments, must not themselves violate the Constitution. 
Notwithstanding the presence of some limitations, however, 
Congress’s authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment 
should be viewed more broadly than the Flores standard permits.  
In McCulloch, the Court construed the words “necessary and 
proper”401 in a manner which gave Congress wide latitude to en-
act federal legislation, rejecting the contention that the word 
“necessary” meant “absolutely or indispensably necessary.”402  
The word “appropriate,” as it appears in Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment, cannot reasonably be construed to be more 
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restrictive of Congress’s authority than the word “necessary” in 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.  The propriety of legislation is 
a political judgment for Congress to make. 
Justice Kennedy, who authored the opinion of the Court in 
Flores and introduced the “congruence and proportionality” test, 
took a contrary position during his confirmation hearings before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee.  When questioned by Senator 
Arlen Specter about the U.S. Supreme Court’s status as the final 
arbiter of the Constitution, then-Judge Kennedy stated that 
Congress would have the legislative authority to provide news-
papers with heightened protection from libel suits if New York 
Times v. Sullivan403 were overruled.404  He believed that Con-
gress had the authority to bring back the “actual malice” stan-
dard by statute if the Court were to reject it as a matter of consti-
tutional law.405  He made it clear that, in his view, Congress 
“could make that judgment as a constitutional matter.”406  Need-
less to say, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, though gov-
erning a different subject, sought to accomplish an objective simi-
lar to that described in Judge Kennedy’s hypothetical.  While 
Congress lacks the power to overrule the Court’s decisions inter-
preting the Constitution, its prophylactic power under Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment should be viewed as broad 
enough to sustain a statute such as the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act. 
The lack of deference shown to Congress’s determinations 
about what is “appropriate legislation” to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment should meet an aggressive legislative response.  
Even without resorting to the constitutional amendment process 
established by Article V, Congress has several options available.  
Primarily, Congress should look for alternative sources of legisla-
tive jurisdiction to accomplish its objectives.  For example, the 
Court concluded in Oregon v. Mitchell that Congress exceeded its 
authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment 
when it lowered the minimum voting age from twenty-one to 
eighteen in state elections.407  Mitchell, of course, was decided be-
fore the adoption of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.  Section One 
of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment states that “[t]he right of citi-
zens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, 
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by 
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any State on account of age.”408  The Twenty-Sixth Amendment 
itself accomplished what the statute sought to do, making further 
substantive legislation unnecessary.  Section Two of the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment states that “Congress shall have power to en-
force this article by appropriate legislation.”409  It is very similar 
to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, so it probably 
could be used to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment im-
munity under the rationale of Fitzpatrick.  If a state were to dis-
criminate against eighteen- to twenty-year-olds with respect to 
electoral matters, Congress could use Section Two of the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment to subject that state to suits brought by pri-
vate individuals in federal court to redress the alleged constitu-
tional violations.  The same principle would apply to the En-
forcement Clauses of the Fifteenth, Nineteenth and Twenty-
Fourth Amendments. 
Congress has the power of the purse and, therefore, can use 
the Taxing and Spending Clause to accomplish many of its objec-
tives.  Under South Dakota v. Dole, Congress is empowered to 
condition the receipt of federal funds on the states’ compliance 
with certain policy directives.410  Perhaps Congress should use 
this power more aggressively in order to meet some of its broader 
objectives. 
There are already signs that Congress is using this power, 
along with its powers under other constitutional provisions, to 
achieve objectives similar to those that prompted the enactment 
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  For instance, the Reli-
gious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000411 at-
tempts to mitigate the damage to religious freedom that was 
done by the Smith and Flores decisions.  The Act states: 
 No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious 
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, . . . even 
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the 
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that per-
son . . . is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and . . . is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.412   
This legislative mandate  
applies in any case in which . . . the substantial burden is imposed in 
a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance; 
or . . . [in which] the substantial burden affects, or removal of that 
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substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, 
among the several States, or with Indian tribes.413 
It is clear from the language of the statute that Congress sought 
to use its powers under the Spending Clause, as well as its pow-
ers under the Foreign, Interstate and Indian Commerce Clauses, 
to compensate for the narrow construction given to the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause in Flores.  A similar 
provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Per-
sons Act restricts governmental land use regulations that sub-
stantially burden the ability of people to freely exercise their re-
ligion.414 
In Cutter v. Wilkinson, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously 
held that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.415  Justice Ginsburg, who delivered the opinion of 
the Court, noted that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act at 
issue in Flores had “lacked a Commerce Clause underpinning or 
a Spending Clause limitation to recipients of federal funds.”416  
Nevertheless, she made it clear that the Court was not deciding 
whether the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act was a valid exercise of the Commerce and Spending Clauses, 
thereby limiting the Court’s holding in Cutter to the Establish-
ment Clause issue.417  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit had found the Act to be in violation of the Establishment 
Clause, making an inquiry into the bases for legislative jurisdic-
tion unnecessary.418  The U.S. Supreme Court, reversing the 
Court of Appeals, found the “institutionalized-persons provision 
compatible with the Establishment Clause because it alleviates 
exceptional government-created burdens on private religious ex-
ercise.”419  Since the Court of Appeals never addressed the Spend-
ing and Commerce Clause issues, the U.S. Supreme Court did 
not address them either. 
In any event, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act is undoubtedly valid under both constitutional provi-
sions.  Under Dole, Congress has wide latitude to condition the 
receipt of federal funds on the states’ compliance with certain 
federal legislative mandates.  In the alternative scenario, the Act 
contains a jurisdictional element that limits its application to a 
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discrete category of cases in which commerce is affected.  Such a 
jurisdictional element was lacking in the Gun-Free School Zones 
Act at issue in Lopez and the Violence Against Women Act at is-
sue in Morrison.  The breadth of Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause was illustrated by the Court’s recent decision 
in Gonzales v. Raich, which held that the power vested in Con-
gress by the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause “includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and 
use of marijuana in compliance with [state] law.”420  In a concur-
ring opinion, Justice Scalia noted that, “[w]here necessary to 
make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress 
may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not them-
selves substantially affect interstate commerce.”421 
The Supremacy Clause of Article VI states:  
 This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.422   
As the Court noted in Missouri v. Holland: “Acts of Congress are 
the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the 
Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made un-
der the authority of the United States.”423  Consequently, treaties 
can be used to expand federal legislative jurisdiction.  In order to 
bring back the Violence Against Women Act that was invalidated 
in Morrison, President George W. Bush could sign a treaty with a 
foreign power that pledges each nation to take the steps neces-
sary to protect women from gender-motivated violence.  The Sen-
ate could proceed to give its advice and consent to the treaty pur-
suant to Article II.  At that point, a new source of legislative 
jurisdiction would come into being.  Such a treaty may not be 
self-executing for purposes of the standard discussed in Foster & 
Elam v. Neilson424 and United States v. Percheman,425 but the 
Necessary and Proper Clause would give Congress the power to 
enact legislation designed to implement the treaty.  Congress 
could enact a statute identical to the one invalidated in Morrison, 
thereby creating a cause of action under federal law for victims of 
gender-motivated violence.  It could be called the Violence 
Against Women Treaty Act, and it would be “necessary and 
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proper for carrying into Execution”426 the President’s powers un-
der the Treaty Clause. 
There are also more direct ways in which Congress could 
confront the federal courts.  In Nixon v. United States, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that challenges to the procedures used by 
the Senate to try impeachment cases present nonjusticiable po-
litical questions.427  The same is likely true of challenges to the 
grounds for impeachment, particularly since Article I gives the 
House of Representatives “the sole Power of Impeachment” and 
the Senate “the sole Power to try all Impeachments.”428  There-
fore, federal courts have no constitutional authority to review 
impeachment determinations made by the House and Senate.429  
If the House were to bring impeachment charges against a fed-
eral judge, the only recourse available to that judge would be an 
argument for acquittal in the Senate.  If the Senate were to con-
vict such a judge and effectuate his or her removal from office, 
such a determination would likely be final and incapable of re-
view.  Notwithstanding the overtly confrontational nature of the 
impeachment process and the political pressures that sometimes 
prevent its use, it remains an option available to Congress when 
judges evade their responsibilities or usurp legislative authority. 
Congress also has the power to regulate the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts.  Congress can use this power to keep the 
courts in check, as it did during the events leading up to Ex parte 
McCardle.430  In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court was unable to 
reach the merits because Congress had repealed the underlying 
jurisdictional statute.  As the Court explained, “[j]urisdiction is 
the power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only 
function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and 
dismissing the cause.”431  Congress can deal with judicial ex-
cesses by amending the jurisdictional statutes that give the fed-
eral courts their power to decide cases and order relief. 
Finally, the option once proposed by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt remains available to Congress at all times.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1 states that “[t]he Supreme Court of the United States shall 
consist of a Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate 
justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum.”432  Since the 
Constitution prescribes no number, Congress has the power to 
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create more seats on the U.S. Supreme Court.  Such a move 
would, of course, dilute the importance of the votes of the existing 
members of the Court.  The fact that there are nine Justices is 
solely the result of a statutory mandate.  There is no constitu-
tional impediment to a federal law designed to pack the Court. 
There is a political equilibrium in Washington that usually 
prevents Congress from taking these drastic steps.  With two ma-
jor political parties and countless other factions comprising a di-
verse Congress, it is unlikely that any significant legislative ini-
tiatives to curtail abuses by the federal courts will pass in the 
near future.  Each party or faction is afraid that another will 
reap the benefits of a stronger Congress, and this dynamic pre-
vents the body as a whole from acting to reassert its authority. 
In any event, Congress must not remain impotent when its 
authority is undermined.  For an entire decade, Congress has 
seen the Judiciary restrict Congress’s powers in a relentless 
manner.  Perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Hibbs, 
Lane and Goodman are a sign that the Court is finally starting to 
retreat.  Time will ultimately tell if this is the case.  Chief Justice 
John G. Roberts, Jr., and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., have now 
replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, and the 
direction that the Court will take in the future remains uncer-
tain.  Perhaps the Court’s two newest members will show more 
deference to Congress than Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
O’Connor did, thereby decreasing tensions between America’s 
legislators and jurists.  If the Court continues to usurp Con-
gress’s authority, however, Congress will have no choice other 
than to act.   
That is not to say that all judges deserve to be condemned.  
Most members of the Judiciary serve the American people with 
the highest level of respect for our constitutional tradition.  Nev-
ertheless, the same is true of those who serve as elected officials.  
The power that they exercise comes from the people who elect 
them, and our Constitution confirms that “We the People” are the 
ultimate authority in this country.433  Congress simply cannot 
remain silent when unelected judges usurp the authority of the 
people.  While judges are entitled to respect when they carry out 
their role in the constitutional design, they must learn to show a 
greater degree of respect for America’s elected officials.  The 
courts, after all, have no real power to enforce their decisions.  
They rely on the Executive Branch to enforce their judgments, 
and the Executive Branch has to rely on Congress to supply the 
needed resources.  Under our Constitution, there are three co-
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equal branches of government, none of which is superior to the 
others. 
